A neural network model of adaptively timed reinforcement learning and hippocampal dynamics by Grossberg, Stephen & Merrill, John W. L.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Cognitive & Neural Systems CAS/CNS Technical Reports
1992-01






A NEURAL NETWORK MODEL OF 
ADAPTIVELY TIMED REINFORCEMENT LEARNING 
AND HIPPOCAMPAL DYNAMICS 
Stephen Grossberg and John W. L. Merrill 
January, 1992 
Technical Report CAS/CNS-91-020 
Permission to copy without fee all or part of this material is granted provided that: 1. the copies are not made 
or distributed for direct commercial advantage, 2. the report title, author, document number, and release 
date appear, and notice is given that copying is by permission of the BOSTON UNIVERSITY CENTER 
FOR ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS AND DEPARTMENT OF COGNITIVE AND NEURAL SYSTEMS. To copy 
otherwise, or to republish, requires a fee and/or special permission. 
Copyright@ 1991 
Boston University Center for Adaptive Systems and 
Department of Cognitive and Neural Systems 
111 Cummington Street 
Boston, MA 02215 
A NEURAL NETWORK MODEL OF 
ADAPTIVELY TIMED REINFORCEMENT LEARNING 
AND HIPPOCAMPAL DYNAMICS 
Stephen Grossbergt and John W.L. Merrill+ 
Center for Adaptive Systems and Department of Cognitive and Neural Systems 
Boston University, 111 Cummington Street, Boston, MA 02215 
ABSTRACT 
A neural model is described of how adaptively timed reinforcement learning occurs. The 
adaptive timing circuit is suggested to exist in the hippocampus, and to involve convergence 
of dentate granule cells on CA3 pyramidal cells, and NMDA receptors. This circuit forms 
part of a model neural system for the coordinated control of recognition learning, reinforce-
ment learning, and motor learning, whose properties clarify how an animal can learn to 
acquire a delayed reward. Behavioral and neural data are summarized in support of each 
processing stage of the system. The relevant anatomical sites are in thalamus, neocortex, 
hippocampus, hypothalamus, amygdala, and cerebellum. Cerebellar influences on motor 
learning are distinguished from hippocampal influences on adaptive timing of reinforcement 
learning. The model simulates how damage to the hippocampal formation disrupts adaptive 
timing, eliminates attentional blocking, and causes symptoms of medial temporal amnesia. It 
suggests how normal acquisition of subcortical emotional conditioning can occur after cortical 
ablation, even though extinction of emotional conditioning is retarded by cortical ablation. 
The model simulates how increasing the duration of an unconditioned stimulus increases 
the amplitude of emotional conditioning, but does not change adaptive timing; and how an 
increase in the intensity of a conditioned stimulus "speeds up the clock", but an increase 
in the intensity of an unconditioned stimulus does not. Computer simulations of the model 
fit parametric conditioning data, including a Weber law property and an inverted U prop-
erty. Both primary and secondary adaptively timed conditioning are simulated, as are data 
concerning conditioning using multiple interstimulus intervals (ISis), gradually or abruptly 
changing ISis, partial reinforcement, and multiple stimuli that lead to time-averaging of 
responses. Neurobiologically testable predictions are made to facilitate further tests of the 
model. 
1. Introduction 
This article contributes to the development of a behavioral and neurobiological theory 
of learning and memory. The theory describes how processes of learning, recognition, re-
inforcement, and recall interact to focus attention upon motivationally desired goals, to 
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generate appropriate actions towards these goals, and to regulate selective forgetting of en-
vironmental contingencies that no longer predict behavioral success. Recent contributions 
to the theory are found in Grossberg (1987a), Grossberg and Levine (1987), Grossberg and 
Schmajuk (1987, 1989), Levine and Prueitt (1989, 1991) and Schmajuk and DiCarlo (1991). 
Although derived from postulates aimed at explaining vertebrate behavior, the theory has 
also been applied to explain neurobiological data concerning classical conditioning of the 
invertebrate Aplysia (Buonomano, Baxter, and Byrne, 1990). Other empirically supported 
predictions and as-yet-untested predictions of the theory are reviewed in Carpenter and 
Grossberg (1991a, 1991b) and Grossberg (1991). These models have also been incorporated 
into the control architecture of freely moving adaptive robots for use in technology (Baloch 
and Waxman, 1991a, 1991b). 
The present article further develops a part of the theory, introduced in Grossberg and 
Schmajuk (1989), which analyses how recognition events control motivated behaviors that are 
adaptively timed. Several different types of brain processes organize the temporal unfolding 
of serial order in behavior. The present model instantiates one type of timing control, 
called spectral timing, and shows how it can modulate the course of recognition learning, 
reinforcement learning, and the timed onset of a goal-oriented action. The model's formal 
processing stages are also compared with anatomical, neurophysiological, and biochemical 
data about several brain regions, notably the hippocampal formation. 
1.2 Timing the Balance between Exploration for Novel Rewards and Consum-
mation of Expected Rewards 
The spectral timing model clarifies the following type of behavioral competence. Many 
goal objects may be delayed subsequent to the actions that elicit them, or the environmental 
events that signal their subsequent arrival. Humans and many animal species can learn to 
wait for the anticipated arrival of a delayed goal object, even though its time of occurrence 
can vary from situation to situation. Such behavioral timing is important in the lives of 
animals which can explore their environments for novel sources of gratification. On the one 
hand, if an animal does not inhibit its exploratory behavior, then it will starve to death by 
restlessly moving from place to place, unable to remain in one place long enough to obtain 
food there. On the other hand, if an animal inhibits its exploratory behavior for too long 
while waiting for an expected source of food to materialize, then it will starve to death if 
food is not, after all forthcoming. 
Thus the animal's task is to accurately time the expected delay of a goal object based upon 
its previous experiences in a given situation. It needs to balance between its exploratory 
behavior aimed at searching for novel sources of reward, and its consummatory behavior 
aimed at acquiring expected sources of reward. To effectively control this balance, the 
animal needs to be able to suppress its exploratory behavior and focus its attention upon an 
expected source of reward at around the time that the expected delay transpires for acquiring 
the reward. 
1.3 Distinguishing Expected Nonoccurrences from Unexpected Nonoccurrences: 
Inhibiting the Negative Consequences of Expected Nonoccurrences 
This type of timing calibrates the delay of a single behavioral act, rather than the orga-
nization of a correctly timed and speed-controlled sequence of acts. Suppose, for example, 
that a.n animal typically receives food from a food magazine two seconds after pushing a. 
lever, and that the animal orients to the food magazine right after pushing the lever. When 
the animal inspects the food magazine, it perceives the nonoccurrence of food during the 
subsequent two seconds. These nonoccurrences disconfirm the animal's sensory expectation 
that food will appear in the magazine. Because the perceptual processing cycle that pro-
cesses this sensory information occurs at a much faster rate than two seconds, it can compute 
this sensory disconfirmation many times before the two second delay has elapsed. 
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The central issue is: What spares the animal from erroneously reacting to these expected 
nonoccurrences of food during the first two seconds as predictive failures? Why does the 
animal not immediately become so frustrated by the nonoccurrence of food that it shifts 
its attentional focus and releases exploratory behavior aimed at finding food somewhere 
else? Alternatively, if the animal does wait, but food does not appear after the two seconds 
have elapsed, why does the animal then react to the unexpected nonoccurrence of food by 
becoming frustrated, shifting its attention, and releasing exploratory behavior? 
Grossberg and Schmajuk (1989) argued that a primary role of the timing mechanism is to 
inhibit, or gate, the process whereby a disconfirmed expectation would otherwise negatively 
reinforce previous consummatory behavior, shift attention, and release exploratory behavior. 
The process of registering sensory mismatches or matches is not itself inhibited; if the food 
happened to appear earlier than expected, the animal could still perceive it and eat. Instead, 
the effects of these sensory mismatches upon reinforcement, attention, and exploration are 
inhibited. 
One of the main tasks of the present work is to show how processes such as adaptive 
timing, reinforcement learning, attention, and motor learning differ, yet are linked in the 
control of behavior. Thus the exposition needs to describe several different types of circuits 
that form part of a larger neural system. These results were announced in Grossberg and 
Merrill (1991 ). Part I, Section 2, summarizes data concerning timed learning of the rabbit 
nictitating membrane response and the pigeon FI scallop. These data are used in Section 3 
to suggest how the model solves a problem called the Timing Paradox. Section 4 describes 
the new spectral timing model, and illustrates its processes with computer simulations. 
Sections 5-9 describe how the model explains some difficult parametric conditioning data, 
notably data about secondary conditioning and the effects of changing stimulus intensity or 
duration. Sections 10-15 interpret the adaptive timing mechanism in terms of interactions 
between dentate granule cells and CA3 pyramidal cells in the hippocampus, notably at 
NMDA receptors. Neurobiological data in support of this hypothesis are summarized and 
new predictions made. Sections 16-22 summarize computer simulations that show how 
the model can replicate quantitative properties of data from several types of conditioning 
experiments. All of these computer simulations use a single set of parameters. Robustness 
of the model's properties is also demonstrated using different sets of parameters. 
Part II, beginning with Section 23, shows how the spectral timing model may be em-
bedded into a larger neural system for the control of recognition learning, reinforcement 
learning, and motor learning. These sections also summarize behavioral and neural data in 
support of each processing stage of this model system. The relevant anatomical sites are 
in thalamus, neocortex, hippocampus, hypothalamus, amygdala, and cerebellum. The be-
havioral data include an explanation of blocking in normal animals, elimination of blocking 
in hippocampectornized animals, impairing timing in hippocampeetomized animals, medial 
temporal amnesia in hippocampectomized animals, subcortical fear conditioning and abnor-
mal fear extinction in animals with cortical lesions, and disruption of motor learning by 
cerebellar lesions. Various of these data were reported after the corresponding model stages 
were published. Such data illustrate the predictive power of the theory. No claim is made 
that all neural processes are modelled in this system. Rather, the system is a lumped model 
that attempts to provide a minimal representation of the processes that are rate-limiting 
in explaining the targeted data bases. The present work may be viewed as a step in the 
progressive unlumping of the model to analyse ever finer neural processing stages. 
PART I 
SPECTRAL TIMING 
2. Examples of Spectral Timing: Conditioning the Nictitating Membrane Re-
sponse and the FI scallop 
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A well-studied example of spectral timing is the conditioning of the rabbit nictitating 
membrane response. Rabbits, like many mammals, have a translucent sheet of tissue called 
a "nictitating membrane", that acts as a third eyelid. The nictitating membrane response, 
which extends this sheet across the eye, can be classically conditioned. For example, a 
conditioned stimulus, or CS, can be paired with noxious unconditioned stimulus, or US, 
such as a periorbital shock or airpuff, that elicits membrane extension. Smith (1968) studied 
the effect of manipulating the time lag between C S onset and US onset. This lag is called 
the interstimulus interval, or IS I. The C S was a 50 msec tone and the US was a 50 msec 
electric shock. The lSI values were 125, 250, 500, and 1000 msec. The fact that conditioning 
occurred at lSI's much larger than the C S duration implies that an internal trace of the C S 
is stored in short term memory (STM) subsequent to C S offset. Because an internal C S 
trace is needed to bridge the lSI gap between C S offset and US onset, such a paradigm is 
called trace conditioning, to distinguish it from the delay conditioning paradigm wherein the 
C S and US overlap in time. 
Figure 1 
Smith (1968) found that the conditioned response, measured as percentage of responses 
and response amplitude, was determined by both lSI and US intensity, whereas response 
onset rate and peak time were determined by the lSI essentially independently of US in-
tensity. An increase in the mean of the peak response time correlated with an increase in 
the variance of the response curve, for each lSI (Figure 1 ). Grossberg and Schmajuk (1989) 
called this the Weber law property. 
Figure 2 
Figure 2 summarizes a computer simulation by Grossberg and Schmajuk (1989) of the 
Weber law property. The data and computer simulation in Figures 1 and 2 clarify why this 
type of timing is called spectral timing: A temporally sensitive "spectrum" of activations 
exists, that is densely distributed across all finite ISis up to some maximum, and that can be 
tuned by learning to enhance those spectral components that cluster around the experienced 
set of ISis. Another example of spectral timing arises in appetive instrumental conditioning 
with a fixed delay to reward in both rats (Roberts, 1981; Meek and Church, 1987) and 
pigeons (Roberts, Chene;, and Cohen, 1989). In these experiments, animals were rewarded 
for the first lever press (in rats) or key peck (in pigeons) that occurred a fixed time after a 
signal was presented (Figure 3). A characteristic pattern of responding evolved, referred to 
as the FI scallop (Mackintosh, 197 4). Examples of such scallops are shown in Figure 4. 
3. The Timing Paradox and a Solution 
The Weber law property of a spectral timing model provides a way for an animal to 
distinguish between the expected and unexpected nonoccurrences that were discussed in 
Section 1, without losing the capacity to time its conditioned responses. The Timing Paradox 
described in this section clarifies why this is a nontrivial problem. The Timing Paradox 
comprises the following, apparently contradictory, pair of constraints. On the one hand, 
in response to any fixed choice of conditionable lSI, the learned optimal response delay 
approximates the IS I. Thus a model of adaptive timing must accurately discriminate between 
individual temporal delays. On the other hand, expected nonoccurrences throughout the lSI 
should not be treated as predictive failures. Thus the inhibitory signal that prevents this 
from happening must be distributed throughout the lSI. How can a timing model both be 
sharply enough tuned to precisely learn the lSI, yet be broadly enough tuned to inhibit 
orienting responses throughout the entire lSI interval? 
A spectral timing model reconciles the two requirements of accurate optimal temporal 
delay and temporally distributed activation via the Weber law property (Figure 2). Accord-
ing to this property, the breadth of the model's temporal response scales with its peak time. 
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Consequently the onset of the C S causes the immediate initiation of an output signal which 
is sustained throughout the entire lSI, but the peak output of the signal is accurately located 
at the expected arrival time of the US. A solution of the Timing Paradox is achieved by 
assuming that the output of the spectral timing model obeys the Weber law property, and 
that this output signal is used to inhibit the expression of a predictive failure. This inhibition 
occurs throughout the lSI interval, yet timed output peaks at the lSI. Different pathways 
carry the inhibitory signal that blocks expression of predictive failure, and the excitatory 
signal that energizes timed responding. These pathways will be characterized with increasing 
precision in Section 4 and Part II. 
4. START: A Unified Model of Adaptive Timing and Conditioned Reinforcer 
Learning. 
The new adaptive timing model will now be defined. It combines Spectral Timing 
mechanisms with mechanisms from Adaptive Resonance Theory (see Part II). Hence it is 
called the START model. The START model builds upon a previous model of reinforcement 
learning whose processing stages are compared with behavioral and neural data below. Here 
we provide just enough exposition to define the model and to compare its emergent properties 
with these data. 
As illustrated in Section 2, the model uses reinforcement learning experiments, notably 
classical conditioning experiments, to test its mechanisms. Each sensory event is therefore 
called a conditioned stimulus, or C S. The i1" sensory event is denoted by C S;. Event C S; 
activates a population of cells that is called the i 1h sensory representation S; (Figure 3). 
Another population of cells, called a drive representation V, receives a combination of sen-
sory, reinforcement, and homeostatic (or drive) stimuli. Reinforcement learning, emotional 
reactions, and motivational decisions are controlled by v (Grossberg, 1971). In particular, a 
reinforcing event, such as an unconditioned stimulus, or US, is capable of activating v. 
Various authors have invoked representations analo!l;ous to drive representations. Bower 
and his collea&ues have called them emotion nodes (Bower, 1981; Bower, Gilligan, and 
Monteiro, 1981) and Barto, Sutton, and Anderson (1983) have called them adaptive critic 
elements. During conditioning, presentation of a C S; before a US causes activation of S; 
followed by activation of V. Such pairing causes strengthening of the adaptive weight, or long 
term memory trace, in the modifiable synapses from S; to v. This learning event converts C S; 
into a conditioned reinforcer. Conditioned reinforcers hereby acquire the power to activate 
V via the conditioning process. 
Figure 5 
In the START model, reinforcement learning in S; _, v pathways is supplemented by a 
parallel learning process that is concerned with adaptive timing. As shown in Figure 3, both 
of these learning processes output to V, which in turn inhibits a population of cells called 
the orienting subsystem. The orienting subsystem is denoted by A because it is a source 
of nonspecific arousal signals that are capable of initiating frustrative emotional reactions, 
attention shifts, and orienting responses (see Part II). The inhibitory pathway from V to A is 
the gate that prevents these events from occurring in response to expected disconfirmations 
(Section 1). 
A. Limited Capacity Short Term Memory 
The sensory representations S; compete for a limited capacity, or finite total amount, of 
activation. Winning populations are said to be stored in short term memory, or STM. The 
competition is carried out by an on-center off-surround interaction among the populations 
S;. The property of STM storage is achieved by using recurrent, or feedback, pathways 
among the populations. A tendency to select winning populations is achieved by using 
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membrane equations, or shunting interactions, to define each population's activation, and a 
proper choice of feedback signals between populations (Grossberg, 1973, 1982a). Expressed 
mathematically, each C S; activates an STM representation S; whose activity S; obeys the 
shunting on-center off-surround competitive feedback equation: 
(1) 
In (1), I;(t) is the input that is turned on by presentation of CS;. Term -aAS; describes 
passive decay of activity S;. Term J3A(1- S;)(I;(t) + fs(S;)) describes the excitatory effect 
on S; of the input I;(t) and the feedback signal fs(S;) from populationS; to itself. Activity 
S; can continue to grow until it reaches the excitatory saturation point, which is scaled to 
equal1 in (1). Term -8AS;I:,fs(Sk) describes inhibition of S; by competitive signals fs(Sk) 
kfi 
from the off-surround of populations k t= i. Figure 6 summarizes a computer simulation of 
how a brief C S1 gives rise to a sustained STM activation S1, which is partially inhibited 
by competition from So's activation in response to a US. The signal function fs may be 
chosen to have any of the forms depicted in Figure 7 without qualitatively altering model 
properties. In this article, the simple rectification function 
f(w) = [w- JL]+ = max(w- JL,O) (2) 
of Figure 7a is used, except in equation (8) below, which uses a sigmoid signal function as 
in Figure 7b. 
B. Drive Representation 
Figure 6 
Figure 7 
The computer simulations reported herein use only a single drive representation v. Ex-
planations of data arising from competing drive representations are discussed in Grossberg 
(1984, 1987a). The activity D of the drive representation 'D obeys the equation 
(3) 
In (3), term -aDD describes the passive decay of activity D. Term J3DLfD(S;)C; describes 
• the total excitatory effect of all the sensory representations S; on 'D. In this term, the signal 
function f D is chosen as in (2), and C; is the adaptive weight, or long term memory (LTM) 
trace, in the pathway from the sensory representation S; of C S; to the drive representation 
'D. This LTM trace is denoted by C; because its size measures how wellS; can activate 'D, and 
thus how C S; has become a conditioned reinforcer through learning. Because C; multiplies 
fD(S;), a large activation of S; will have a negligible effect on 'D if C; is small, and a large 
effect on 'D if C; is large. Term IJ?R describes the total output of the spectral timing circuit 
to 'D. Output R is defined in (llJ. 
Figure 8 
Figure Sc summarizes a computer simulation in which the activity D responds to C S 
and US signals after 50 conditioning trials. Figures Sa and Sb summarize the corresponding 
STM traces S1 of the CS and S0 of the US, respectively. 
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C. Conditioned Reinforcement 
The adaptive weight C; that calibrates conditioned reinforcement obeys a gated learning 
law (Grossberg, 1969b ): 
d dt C; = acS;( -C; + /3c(l- C;)fc(D)). (4) 
Learning by C; is turned on and off by the signal S; from S;, which thus acts like a learning 
gate, or modulator. Once turned on, C; performs a time-average of activity at the drive 
representation 1> via the signal fc(D), which is chosen as in (2). Activity C1 cannot exceed 
the finite value 1, due to the shunting term 1 - C;. The value of C; can both increase and 
decrease during the course of learning. 
The remaining equations of the model describe the adaptive timing process. 
D. Now Print Signal 
The Now Print signal N is turned on by sufficiently large and rapid increments in the 
activity D of 1>. Signal N turns on the learning process that encodes adaptive timing 
information. The transient signal N is derived from the sustained activity D by the action 
of a slow inhibitory interneuron (Figure 9). The transformation from sustained activity D 
to transient activity N can be realized mathematically by the function 
N = [fc(D)- E- E]+. (5) 
Figure 9 
In (5), E is the activity of an inhibitory interneuron that time-averages fc(D), as in equation 
itE = aE(-E + fc(D)), (6) 
before inhibiting the direct excitatory signal fc(D). Equation (5) means that N = 0 if 
Jc(D)-E ~ f:, and N = fc(D)-E-E if fc(D)-E > c Figures 6d and 7c illustrates how N 
responds to increments in D. An important property of N is that it increases in amplitude, 
but not significantly in duration, in response to larger inputs fc(D). 
E. Activation Spectrum 
The START model is said to control "spectral" timing because each drive representation 
1> is associated with a population of cell sites whose members react at a spectrum of rates rj. 
Neural populations whose elements are distributed along a temporal or spatial parameter 
are familiar throughout the nervous system. Two examf!les are populations of spinal cord 
cells that obey the size principle (Henneman, 1957, 1985), and the spatial frequency-tuned 
cells of the visual cortex (Jones and Keck, 1978; Musselwhite and Jeffreys, 1985; Parker 
and Salzen, 1977a, 1977b; Parker et al., 1982a, 1982b; Plant et al., 1983; Skrandies, 1984; 
Vassilev and Strashimirov, 1979; Vassilev et al., 1983; Williamson et al., 1978). 
The spectral activities Xij that are associated with drive representation 1> and activated 
by sensory representation S; obey the equation 
d dtXij = rj(-Xij + (1- X;j)fx(S;)), (7) 
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where fx satisfies (2). By (1) and (7), presentation of CS; to S; via an input I; generates 
an output signal fx(S;) that activates the local potentials X;j of all cell sites in the target 
population. The potentials X;j respond at rates proportional to r j, j = 1, 2, ... , n. These 
potentials activate the next processing stage via signals 
(8) 
Signal f(x;j) is a sigmoid function of activity Xij· Figure lOa shows the activation spectrum 
f(x;j(t)) that arises from presentation of CS; to S; via input I; in (1), using a choice of rate 
parameters Tj in (20) which range from 10 (fast) to 0.0025 (slow). The method by which 
the simulations were performed is described in the Appendix. 
Figure 10 
F. Habituative Transmitter Spectrum 
Each spectral activation signal f(x;j) interacts with a habituative chemical transmitter 
Vij via the equation 
(9) 
According to equation (9), the amount of neurotransmitter Vii accumulates to a constant 
target Ievell, via term ay(l- Vij), and is inactivated, or habituates, due to a mass action 
interaction with signal f(x;j), via term -/3yf(x;j)Vij· The different rates Tj at which each 
X;j is activated causes the corresponding Vij to become habituated at different rates. A 
habituation spectrum is thereby generated. The signal functions f(x;j(t)) in Figure lOa 
generate the habituation spectrum of Vij(t) curves in Figure lOb. 
G. Gated Signal Spectrum 
Each signal f(x;j) interacts with Vii via mass action. This process is also called gating 
of f(x;j) by Vii to yield a net signal 9ij that is equal to f(x;j)Vij· Each gated signal g;j(t) = 
f(x;j(t))Y;j(t) has a different rate of growth and decay, thereby generating the gated signal 
spectrum shown in Figure lOc. In these curves, each function g;j(t) is a unimodal function of 
time, where function 9ij(t) achieves its maximum value M;j at time Tij, Tij is an increasing 
function of i, and M;j is a decreasing function of j. 
These laws for the dynamics of a chemical transmitter were described in Grossberg (1968, 
1969a). They capture the simplest first-order properties of a number of known transmitter 
regulating steps (Cooper, Bloom, and Roth, 1974), such as transmitter production (term 
ay), feedback inhibition by an intermediate or final stage of production on a former stage 
(term -ayyj), and mass action transmitter inactivation (term -/3yf(xj)Vj)· Alternatively, 
they can be described as the voltage drop across an RC circuit, or the current flow through 
an appropriately constructed transistor circuit. These properties are sufficient to explain 
the article's targeted data, so finer transmitter processes, such as transmitter mobilization 
effects, are not considered herein. 
H. Spectral Learning Law 
Learning of spectral timing obeys a gated steepest descent equation 
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(10) 
where N is the Now Print signal of (5). Each long term memory (LTM) trace z;1 in (10) 
is activated by its own sampling signal g;j = f(x;j)Yij· The sampling signal g;j turns on, 
or gates, the learning process, and causes Zij to approach N during the sampling interval 
at a rate proportional to g;j. The attraction of z;1 to N is called steepest descent. Thus (10) is an example of learning by gated steepest descent. Each z;1 changes by an amount 
that reflects the degree to which the curves g;j(t) and N(t) have simultaneously large values 
through time. If g;j is large when N is large, then z;1 increases in size. If g;j is large when 
N is small, then z;1 decreases in size. As in equation (4), Zij can either increase or decrease 
as a result of learning. 
Associative learning by gated steepest descent was incorporated into neural network 
models in Grossberg (1969b) and is the learning law that was used to introduce adaptive 
resonance theory (Grossberg, 1976a, 1976b). An associative learning law of this form was 
subsequently used by Levy and his colleagues to model their data on hippocampal LTP 
(Levy, Brassel, and Moore, 1983; Levy and Desmond, 1985). Singer (1983) has also used 
such a law to model his experiments on adaptive tuning of visual cortical cells during the 
visual critical period. These experiments support the adaptive resonance theory predictions 
(Grossberg, 1976a, 1976b) that both hippocampal LTP and feature detector tuning in visual 
cortex should obey such a learning law. 
As noted above, the time interval between C S onset and US onset is called the interstim-
ulus interval, or lSI. Using the spectral learning law (10), the individual I:fM traces differ 
in their ability to learn at different values of the lSI. This is the basis of the network's timing 
properties. Figure 11 illustrates how six different LTM traces Zj, i = 1, ... , 6, learn during 
this simulated learning experiment. The C Sand US are paired during 4 learning trials, after 
which the C Sis presented alone on a single performance trial. In this computer simulation, 
the CS input Ics(t) remained on for a duration of 0.05 time units on each learning trial. 
The US input lus(t) was presented after an lSI of 0.5 time units and remained on for 0.05 
time units. The upper panel in each part of the figure depicts the gated signal function g;1(t) 
with Tj chosen at progressively slower rates. The middle panel plots the corresponding LTM 
trace z;1(t). 
Figure 11 
I. Doubly Gated Signal Spectrum 
The lower panel plots the twice-gated signal h;1(t) = f(x;1(t))y;1(t)z;1(t). Each twice-
gated signal function h;j(t) registers how well the timing of CS and US is learned and 
read-out by the i 1" processing channel. In Figure lld, where the once-gated signal g;1(t) 
peaks at approximately the lSI of 0.5 time units, the LTM trace z;1(t) shows the maximum 
learning. The twice-gated signal h;1(t) also shows a maximal enhancement due to learning, 
and exhibits a peak of activation at approximately 0.5 time units after onset of the C S on 
each trial. This behavior is also generated on the fifth trial, during which only the C S is 
presented. 
J. Output Signal 
The output of the network is the sum of the twice-gated signals h;1(t) from all the 




The output signal computes the cumulative learned reaction of the whole population to the 
input pattern. Figure 10e shows the function R derived from the h;1 shown in Figure 10d. 
A comparison of Figures lOc-e illustrate how the output R(t) generates an accurately timed 
response from the cumulative partial learning of all the cell sites in the population spectrum. 
The once-gated signals g;1(t) in Figure 10c are biased towards early times. The twice-gated 
signals h;1(t) in Figure lOd are biased towards the IS!, but many signals peak at other 
times. The output R(t) combines these partial views into a cumulative response that peaks 
at the lSI. 
5. The Problem of Self-Printing during Adaptively Timed Secondary Condition-
ing 
The START model overcomes four types of problems whose solution is needed to explain 
behavioral and neural data about adaptively timed conditioning. These are the problems of 
(1) self-printing during adaptively timed secondary conditioning, (2) asymmetric effects of 
increasing C S or US intensity on timed responding, (3) different effects of US duration on 
timing than on reinforcement, and (4) combinatorial explosion of network pathways. These 
problems and their solution by the START model are described below, along with supportive 
data. Problems (1), (3), and (4) were not solved by the Grossberg and Schmajuk (1989) 
model. 
A major problem for any model of adaptive timing is to explain how adaptively timed 
secondary conditioning can occur. In primary conditioning, a conditioned stimulus C S 1 is 
paired with an unconditioned stimulus US until CS1 becomes a conditioned reinforcer. In 
secondary conditioning, another conditioned stimulus C S2 is paired with C S1 until it, too, 
gains reinforcing properties. Various experiments have shown that the conditioned response 
to CS2 can be adaptively timed (Gormezano and Kehoe, 1984; Kehoe, Marshall-Goodell, and 
Gormezano, 1987). Indeed, Gormezano and Kehoe (1984) claimed that, in their experimental 
paradigm, "first- and second-order conditioning follow the same laws" (p. 314), although 
they also acknowledged that some variables may differentially effect first-order and second-
order conditioning in other paradigms. 
Adaptively timed secondary conditioning could easily erase the effects of adaptively timed 
primary conditioning in the following way. In order for C 81 to act as a conditioned reinforcer, 
C 81 must gain control of the pathway along which the US activates its reinforcing properties. 
Suppose that C 81 activated its sensory representation s1 via an input (Ics1 ) pathway and 
that US expressed its reinforcing properties via an input (Ius) pathway. Also suppose that 
conditioned reinforcer learning enabled CS1 to activate Ius· Thereafter, presentation of CS1 
would simultaneously activate both the Ics1 pathway and the Ius pathway. This coactivation 
would create new learning trials for C 81 with a zero IS I. In other words C 81 could self-print 
a spectrum with zero lSI due to CSrCS1 pairing via the Ics and conditioned Ius pathway. 
Thus, as CS1 became a conditioned reinforcer, it could undermine the timing that it learned 
through C 81-U S pairing during primary conditioning. Such self-printing could, for example, 
occur on secondary conditioning trials when a C 82 is followed by a conditioned reinforcer 
CSI-
6. Simulations of Secondary Conditioning 
The START model overcomes the self-printing problem with its use of a transient Now 
Print signal N, as in (5). During primary conditioning, onset of the US causes a brief output 
burst from N. During secondary conditioning, onset of the conditioned reinforcer CS1 also 
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causes a brief output burst from N. However, the spectrum activated by CS1 takes awhile 
to build up, so essentially all of its activities x;1 and sampling signals f(x;j)Yij are very small 
during the brief interval when N is large (Figures lOa and lOc). By the spectral learning law 
(10), negligible self-printing occurs. The main effect of the self-printing that does occur is to 
reduce every spectral LTM trace ZJJ in (10) by a fixed proportion of its value, thus scaling 
down the size of R(t) without changing the timing of its peak. 
Figure 12a depicts the model output R(t) when the Now Print threshold E in (5) is set 
to a high enough level to guarantee that no self-printing or secondary conditioning occur. 
Here C S1 never activates a Now Print signal. Figure 12b shows the output when E is set 
lower, thus allowing secondary conditioning and some self-printing to occur. Correct timing 
still obtains. 
Figure 12 
Figure 13 shows how the model behaves during secondary conditioning. The left hand 
half of each panel shows the output of the model in response to the primary conditioned 
stimulus C S1, and the right hand half of each panel shows the model output in response 
to the secondary conditioned stimulus C 82. The peak time arising from the presentation of 
C S2 occurs near the expected time of arrival of C S1, rather than the expected time of the 
US. This property is consistent with the environment that a model or animal experiences, 
since the subject never sees CS2 paired with the primal US, but rather sees it paired as a 
predictor of CS1 , which serves as a CR in this context. 
Figure 13 
7. The Asymmetry between CS and US Processing in Timing Control 
Although C S1 can attain properties of a conditioned reinforcer through C S1-U S pairing, 
this does not imply that all the functional properties of a conditioned reinforcer and an 
unconditioned stimulus are interchangeable. In fact, increasing the intensity of a conditioned 
reinforcer CS1 can "speed up the clock" (Maricq, Roberts, and Church, 1981; Meek and 
Church, 1987; Wilke, 1987), whereas increasing the intensity of a primary US can increase 
the amplitude of conditioned response, but does not change its timing (Smith, HJ68). 
The fact that parametric changes of C S and US cause different effects on adaptive 
timing places a strong constraint on possible mechanisms of how adaptive timing is learned 
during secondary conditioning. Although the C S acquires reinforcing properties of a US 
when it becomes a conditioned reinforcer, it does not acquire all of its timing properties. 
Our proposed solution of the self-printing problem implies an explanation of the different 
responses caused by an increase in C S intensity or US intensity. This explanation holds even 
if the C 81 and US sensory representations s1 and s0, respectively, each send signals along 
the same types of pathways to the drive representation and the adaptive timing circuit. The 
explanation is summarized below. 
An increase in CS1 intensity causes an increase in the amplitude of input h(t) in (1). 
The larger input causes a. larger peak amplitude of activity S1 in (1 ), and a larger signal 
fx(S1) in (7). By (7), the rate with which a spectral activation x11 reacts to signal fx(SJ) 
equals rj(l + fx(S1)). Thus an increase in CS1 intensity speeds up the processing of all 
spectral activations x 11 . Because CS1 is a. conditioned reinforcer, some of its LTM traces z11 
are nonzero. Thus the total output R in (11) peaks at an earlier time, and causes the total 
output D from V in (3) to also peak at an earlier time. 
In contrast, a primary reinforcer such as a. US does not generate a. significant output 
R(t) from the spectral timing circuit, even if it is allowed to generate a large signal fx(S0 ) 
to the adaptive timing circuit in (7). This is true because a. large US generates a. signal 
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fx(So) to the spectral activations in (7) at the same time that it generates a large signal 
fp(So) to Din (3) and a large Now Print signal N in 15). Thus a US creates the conditions 
of a "zero ISI experiment" for purposes of spectral learning. All the LTM traces zoj in 
(10) therefore remain very small in response to any number of US representations. An 
increase in US amplitude thus cannot cause speed-up of the output R(t) in (11), because 
this output remains approximately zero in response to any US intensity. In summary, the 
same mechanism that explains how the self-printing problem is avoided also explains why 
an increase in C S intensity, but not US intensity, speeds up the conditioned response. 
The primary effect of an increase in US intensity is to increase the amplitude of the 
signal fo(So) in (3) to the drive representation D. This causes an increase in the amplitude 
of D and thus an increase in the amplitude of the conditioned response that is modulated by 
D. This explanation of how a US increases the amplitude of the conditioned response also 
holds if the US sends no signal fx(S0) directly to the adaptive timing circuit. See Grossberg 
and Schmajuk (1989) for a further discussion of this issue. 
Figure 14 
8. Different Effects of US Duration on Emotional Conditioning and Adaptive 
Timing: Sustained and Transient Responses 
The existence of a transient Now Print signal N plays a central role in our explanations 
of how to avoid self-printing during secondary conditioning, and of different effects of C S 
and US intensity on learned timing. Another type of data lends support to the hypothesis 
that the activity D and the Now Print signal N both exist but respond to the US in different 
ways. These data show that an increase in US duration can significantly increase the strength 
of emotional conditioning (Ashton, Bitgood, and Moore, 1969; Boe, 1966; Borozci, Storms, 
and Broen, 1964; Church, Raymond, and Beauchamp, 1967; Keehn, 1963; Strouthes, 1965). 
How can a brief Now Print signal N whose duration does not increase significantly with US 
duration coexist with emotional conditioning properties that do increase significantly with 
US duration? 
An answer can be given using properties of drive representations D. The activation D 
of a drive representation by a US does persist longer when the US duration is increased, 
and does thereby increase the strength of emotional conditioning at the S ___, D synapses 
that are modelled by equations (3) and (4); see Grossberg (1972b, Section 4) and Gross-
berg (1982a) for further discussion of this property. This sustained activation D of a drive 
representation gives rise to a transient Now Print signal N at a different processing stage 
-- a transient detector - that is downstream from D itself, as displayed in Figures 5 and 9. 
Thus D and N represent responses of "sustained cells" and "transient cells" - a distinction 
familiar from visual perception ··-· which here instantiate different functional properties of 
emotional conditioning and conditioning of adaptive timing, respectively. The parametric 
data properties summarized in Sections 6-8 illustrate that the processes of emotional con-
ditioning and adaptive timing, although linked, are not the same. They also support the 
START model's proposal of how these processes interact. 
9. The Problem of Combinatorial Explosion: Stimulus vs. Drive Spectra 
According to any spectral timing theory, each C S; activates a sensory representation 
S; that broadcasts signals along many parallel pathways. This can lead to a combinatorial 
explosion of cell bodies if the spectra are incorrectly instantiated. For example, suppose that 
each pathway activated a different cell, and that each cell's activity computed a different 
x;j, j = 1, 2, ... , n. Then there would exist as many copies of the spectral timing model 
as there are sensory representations in the brain. In addition, each spectrum contains 80 
activities x;1 in our computer simulations. Such a model would require a huge number of 
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cells to represent a different spectrum for every possible sensory representation. This is, in 
fact, the type of circuit used in the Grossberg-Schmajuk model. 
In the START model, each drive representation, not every sensory representation, has 
its own spectral cells. Thus the pathways from all sensory representations that correspond 
to any given drive representation share the same neurons. This modification greatly reduces 
the number of cells that are needed to achieve spectral timing of arbitrary conditionable 
C S- US combinations, since there are many fewer drive representations (e.g., for hunger, 
thirst, sex, etc.) than there are sensory representations. As in Figure 3, each spectrum 
is computed in parallel with its drive representation. Since the present simulations only 
consider one type of reinforcer, only one drive representation is depicted. In general, each 
C S sends an adaptive pathway to every drive representation to which it can be conditioned, 
as well as adaptive pathways sufficient to sample the corresponding spectral representation. 
The "coordinates" of each drive representation and its spectrum encode reinforcement and 
homeostatic variables. In contrast, the C S-activated pathways to these circuits carry signals 
that reflect the sensory features of the C Ss. Thus the fact that different perceptual stimuli 
may elicit characteristic responses at the cells which represent adaptive timing does not, in 
itself, imply that these perceptual stimuli are "encoded" at those cells. 
It is suggested below how hippocampal cells can form an adaptive timing circuit, and 
how dendrites of hippocampal pyramidal cells can represent a drive-based spectrum that 
avoids the combinatorial explosion. A brief historical discussion will first be given to clarify 
the larger neural context in which this proposal needs to be evaluated. 
10. Conditioning and the Hippocampus 
Learning within the S ____, v pathways of Figure 3 was predicted in Grossberg (1971, 1975) 
to have the hippocampal formation as a final common path. It was also predicted that this 
type of learning is a variant of conditioned reinforcer learning. The distinction between the 
different learning processes that govern emotional conditioning and adaptive timing was not, 
however, made in these early articles. In experiments on conditioning the rabbit nictitating 
membrane response, Berger and Thompson (1978) reported that hippocampal learning does 
occur, thereby providing partial support for the prediction. At first, these investigators inter-
preted their results as the discovery of a general neural "engram". Subsequent experiments 
studied the effects of selective ablations on learning in both hippocampus and cerebellum 
(McCormick, Clark, Lavond, and Thompson, 1982). These experiments led to the conclusion 
that hippocampal learning appears to be a variant of the predicted conditioned reinforcer 
learning, whereas the cerebellum carries out a type of motor learning. Thompson et aJ. 
(1984, p. 82) distinguished these two types of learning as "conditioned fear" and "learning 
of the discrete adaptive response", respectively, a distinction that had also been predicted, 
and that is elaborated in Part II. 
It should also be emphasized that this interpretation of hippocampal function does not 
contradict other data which implicate the hippocampal formation in the learning of spatial 
and attentional tasks (Isaacson and Pribram, 1986; O'Keefe and Nadel, 1978). Such a hybrid 
functional role for hippocampus in conditioned reinforcement, spatial approach and avoid-
ance, and attentional blocking was mechanistically outlined and predicted by the theory's 
earliest model circuits (Grossberg, 1971, 1975; reviewed in 1987a). In support of such a 
hybrid function, Eichenbaum and Cohen (1988) have summarized recent data showing that 
the same hippocampal cells which have place fields in a radial-arm maze can also show con-
ditioned responses in classical conditioning tasks. The present article focuses on clarifying 
how the emotional conditionin$ and adaptive timing processes are designed and related to 
each other. In particular, as mdicated in Figure 5, reinforcement learning and adaptive 
timing are suggested to take place in different neural circuits, but circuits that interact with 
and modulate each other during normal behaviors. As reviewed below, aspects of emotional 
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conditioning may be spared even if adaptive timing is deranged, just as aspects of motor 
performance may be spared even if adaptive timing is deranged. 
11. Adaptively Timed Conditioning of Hippocampal Pyramidal Cells 
A large number of experiments have by now documented a role for hippocampal cells in 
adaptively timed conditioning. As Berger, Berry, and Thompson (1986, p. 204) have noted, 
"One of the striking features of these conditioning-induced changes in hippocampal activity is 
that a close parallel develops between the pattern of C S-evoked hippocampal pyramidal cell 
activity and the shape of the conditioned response- both during NM (nictitating membrane) 
aversive (Berger, Laham, and Thompson, 1980) and CJM (jaw movement) appetitive (Berry 
and Oliver, 1982) paradigms". In addition, when animals were conditioned using dilferent 
C S - US lSI intervals, the poststimulus histograms of pyramidal cell firing paralleled the 
shape of the NM response at ISIs of 150 msec and 250 msec. A 50 msec ISI did not lead to 
a conditioned NM response, and no enhancement of hippocampal unit activity occurred in 
either the C S-US interval or the US interval (Boehler and Thompson, 1980). In addition, 
in a signal detection task in which a white noise C S was varied from suprathreshold to 
threshold intensity, hippocampal firing to the C S completely predicted the occurrence of a 
behavioral response (Kettner and Thompson, 1982). 
Such data led Berger, Thompson, and their colleagues to characterize the response pat-
tern of hippocampal pyramidal cells as a "temporal model" of the conditioned response, 
a proposal that was also espoused by Solomon (1979, 1980). The START model suggests 
how this "temporal model" develops and how it is integrated into a larger neural system for 
reinforcement learning, recognition learning, and motor learning. 
12. Comparison of Conditioned Properties of Hippocampal Pyramids, NMDA 
Receptors at Dentate Cells, and Hippocampal Afferents 
Berger, Berry, and Thompson (1986) reported data from dentate granule cells showing 
"increased firing rate beginning in the C S period and continuing through the US period .... 
For any given cell, the latency of increased firing was constant and was time-locked to the 
CS" (p. 213). This difference between the "time-locked" responses of dentate granule cells 
and the adaptively timed responses of hippocampal pyramidal cells suggests that pyramidal 
cells and dentate cells process hippocampal afferents in different ways. Berger et al. (1986) 
also reviewed data indicating that the high correlation between firing of hippocampal pyra-
midal cells and conditioned responses cannot be explained solely by conditioned changes in 
afferents to the hippocampus. In particular, Berger and his colleagues (Berger et al. 1986; 
Berger and Weiss, 1987) reviewed data about firing patterns in two major hippocampal af-
ferents, the medial septum and the entorhinal cortex, during conditioning of the nictitating 
membrane response. In the medial septum, each new stimulus generates a short, transient 
burst of activity followed by rapid habituation to the baseline response pattern. The firing 
rate pattern in the entorhinal cortex is more like that seen in areas CA3 and CAl of the hip-
pocampus. However, the hippocampal behavioral trace is much stronger than the entorhinal 
trace and evolves more slowly. Whereas the entorhinal trace takes only 10-20 trials to form 
and to reach its asymptotic level, the hippocampal trace starts forming when responses start 
being generated and continues to grow stronger through the first 100-150 trials (Berger et al., 
1986 ). These data are consistent with the hypothesis that at least part of the hippocampal 
trace is endogenously generated. It needs also to be noted that, although two of the most 
important projections to the hippocampus arise from the medial septum and the entorhinal 
cortex, other areas do send projections there too, among them the supermamillary region 
and the dorsal diagonal gyrus, which project to region CA3 of the hippocampus via the 
fornix, and the anterior and medial dorsal thalamic nuclei, which project to region CAl of 
the hippocampus via the cingulum. Collingridge and Davies (1989, p. 130) discussed addi-
tional evidence that "an increase in transmitter release maintains (hippocampal) LTP. This 
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evidence is strongest for the perforant path input to the dentate gyrus, where the increase 
in transmitter release is dependent on the activation of NMDA receptors". 
13. Conditioning at Dendritic Spines of Dentate Granule Cells 
The formal processing stages of the START model have a natural hippocampal interpre-
tation that mimics the observed differences between dentate granule cells and hippocampal 
pyramidal cells during conditioning, and uses a learning mechanism at the model analog of 
granule cells that is interpreted below in terms of a learned control of transmitter release, 
with associated alterations in protein synthesis. 
The combinatorial explosion of cells that was described in Section 9 is avoided by as-
suming that the spectral activations Xij are local potentials at the dendritic spines of hip-
pocampal dentate granule cells. Thus the Xij do not correspond to separate cells, but rather 
to dendritic spines of a single cell that accumulates signals from many sensory representa-
tions. The many pathways from different sensory representations to the dendrites still need 
to exist, but their targets are a much smaller population of cells and their dendrites. The 
microscopic biophysical details of this interpretation will be developed elsewhere. Here we 
show how the formal linkage of spectral learning properties to hippocampal circuitry leads 
to new explanations and predictions about hippocampal anatomy and neurophysiology. 
In this interpretation, there exists a subset of dentate granule cells that reacts at a single 
spectral averaging rate rj in (7), and different subsets of granule cells react at different rates 
rj. Each such cell possesses a large number of dendrites that are densely encrusted with 
dendritic spines. Each spine is assumed to structurally realize a private channel at which 
individuated activations X;j can be processed at the rate rj. Learning is activated by a 
Now Print signal N that globally activates the entire cell. Figure 14b-e indicates that the 
twice-gated operation f(x;j)YijZij in (11) may be realized in several different ways. 
Figure 14 
14. Convergence of Dentate Granule Cells at CA3 Pyramidal Cells 
This interpretation of the START model suggests that (1) conditioning occurs at dentate 
granule cells, (2) the latency of conditioned firing is constant at individual granule cells, and 
( 3) the hippocampal pyramidal cells to which dentate cells project form a "temporal model" 
of adaptively timed behavioral responses. These data are consistent with the model hypoth-
esis, formalized in equation (11), that the individual terms f( Xij )Yij z;j, which correspond 
to each fixed and different rate rj, summate to generate an adaptively timed model R of 
the behavioral response. We interpret the cells corresponding to different values of r j as 
different (subsets of) dentate granule cells, and the cells corresponding to the output R as 
CA3 pyramidal cells (Figure 15). It is also assumed that different subsets of CA3 pyramidal 
cells correspond to different drive representations (Oids, 1977). 
Figure 15 
This interpretation of (11) suggests that many dentate granule cells converge on individ-
ual CA3 pyramidal cells. This property is consistent with the fact that, in the rat, there are 
approximately 1,000,000 dentate granule cells but only 160,000 CA3 pyramidal cells (Boss, 
Peterson, and Cowan, 1985; Boss, Turlejski, Stanfield, and Cowan, 1987; Squire, Shimamura, 
and Amaral, 1989). In addition, a CA3 cell receives approximately 80 mossy-fiber inputs 
from dentate granule cells (Squire, Shimamura, and Amaral, 1989). It may thus not be a 
coincidence that the Grossberg and Schmajuk (1989) computer simulations and our own 
found that 80 values of rj provide an excellent fit to behavioral data on the conditioned 
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NM response. On the other hand, in unreported simulations we have shown that qualitative 
model properties are robust when the number of populations is increased or decreased by a 
factor of four. In any case, the order of magnitude between anatomical and model conver-
gence is acceptable. This anatomical interpretation can be unequivocally tested in terms of 
the following 
Prediction: Sets of dentate cells, or perhaps a combination of dentate cells and mossy 
fibers, exhibit dynamics capable of giving rise to a full spectrum of activation rates rj· 
Gray (1982, pp. 97-100) has surveyed experiments that are consistent with this neu-
rophysiological interpretation of START learning. These data show habituation in dentate 
granule cells to stimulation of the perforant path, analogous to Yij habituation in response 
to inputs S; in equations (8) and (9); potentiation at the dentate synapse in response to per-
forant path stimulation, analogous to Z;j conditioning in response to inputs S; in equations 
(8) and (10); swelling in the dendritic spines of dentate granule cells after tetanizing stimula-
tion of the perforant pathway, analogous to the anatomical interpretation of the f(x;j)Y;jZij 
process at dentate spines; and facilitation of dentate response to a perforant path pulse by a 
prior conditioning pulse to the septum, analogous to the action of the Now Print signal on 
conditioning in equation (10). 
The START model is also consistent with more recent data concerning the effects of 
manipulations of the dentate gyrus upon the behavior of animals. Diaz-Granados et al. 
(1991) showed that selective dysgenesis of the dentate gyrus in rats due to neonatal X-
irradiation impaired performances in a differential-reinforcement-of-low-rate-of-responding 
(DRL) task: After X-irradiation, which selectively prevents the formation of granule cells, 
animals were unable to run slowly down a hallway to receive reward. In a similar paradigm, 
Robinson (1991) impaired acquisition of the conditioned nictitating membrane response, 
and Thompson and Disterhoft (1991) showed that NMDA agonists and antagonists have 
opposite effects upon long-interval trace eye blink conditioning. These results are consistent 
with the proposed interpretation of the START model: Animals without functional dentate 
granule cells, or with impaired NMDA receptors, should be unable to adaptively time their 
conditioned responses. 
This interpretation is also consistent with the lack of effect of granule cell dysgenesis 
(Armstrong et al., 1991) or NMDA antagonist treatment (Sutherland et al., 1991) upon 
place learning. The START model suggests that the reinforcing value of an event is less 
affected by these manipulations than is the ability to adaptively time reinforced behavior. 
Given this interpretation, the close temporal relationship between being in a place and get-
ting rewarded there may be spared, but distant temporal relationships may be unbridgeable. 
This possibility may be further testable in the context of fear conditioning, where NMDA an-
tagonists impair fear conditioning over an ISI of 4 seconds (Davis et al., 1991). If this failure 
is substantially due to a failure of adaptive timing, then near-normal fear conditioning may 
be found over sufficiently short interstimulus intervals if NMDA antagonists are selectively 
applied to dentate granule cells. 
The occurrence of associative learning on dendritic spines also helps to explain how the 
read-out (or performance) of old associative memories can be decoupled from the read-in (or 
learning) of new associative memories. Such a dissociation is needed to solve the self-printing 
problem (Section 5). By (11) read-out of old associative memories is accomplished by the 
twice-gated signals f(.r;j)Y;jZ;j; also see Figure 15. These signals need to be separated from 
the influence of twice-gated signals activated by other conditioned stimuli and other spectral 
averaging rates. Dendritic spines can provide this functional separation during read-out, 
while also being responsive to more global events, such as the Now Print signal N, during 
LTM read-in via equation (10). 
The hypothesis of the START model that hippocampal LTP occurs at dendritic spines 
in order to functionally dissociate the read-out of old associative memories from the read-in 
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of new associative memories was discussed in Grossberg (1975, see Figure 25). This type 
of process has recently excited a great deal of further work based upon new experimental 
approaches to hippocampal LTP and the discovery of the NMDA receptor (Brown et aJ, 
1988; Brown and Zador, 1990; Eccles, 1989). The START model is consistent with data 
showing that conditioning takes place at NMDA receptors in the perforant-to-dentate path-
way. As Collingridge and Davies (1989, p. 130) have noted: "Most neurochemical evidence 
suggests that an increase in transmitter release maintains LTP. This evidence is strongest 
for the perforant path input to the dentate gyrus, where the increase in transmitter release 
is dependent on the activation of NMDA receptors." 
15. NMDA Receptors and Adaptive Timing 
The recent experiments suggesting that an increase in presynaptic transmitter release 
may help to control LTP at dentate granule cells and includes activation of NMDA receptors 
(Collingridge and Davies, 1989; Errington, Lynch, and Bliss, 1987) are consistent with an-
other early prediction (Grossberg, 1968, 1969a) about associative fearning. This prediction 
suggested that associative learning is achieved by "joint control of presynaptic excitatory 
transmitter production by presynaptic and postsynaptic levels of membrane potential. This 
control is presumed to be effected by the interaction of the pairs (Na+, K+) and (Ca++, 
Mg++) of antagonistic ions whose binding properties to intracellular sites and enzymes set 
cellular production levels" (Grossberg, 1969a, p. 325). In particular, a synergetic interaction 
of a voltage-dependent, postsynaptically generated, inward Ca++ current with inward Na+ 
and outward K+ currents was predicted, as well as a competitive interaction between Ca++ 
and Mg++. Recent studies of LTP at NMDA receptors have reported and greatly elaborated 
contemporary understanding of this sort of interaction, including the competition between 
Ca.++ and Mg++ (Collingridge and Davies, 1989). 
Related predictions may now be testable at the perforant path - CA3 pyramidal cell 
synapse. One prediction suggests that certain "nerve cells are capable of learning as 'chemical 
dipoles' " (Grossberg, l969a, p. 325) control the availability of the proper relative amounts of 
Ca.++, Mg++, Na.+, and K+, among other chemicals, at the cell sites where they are needed. 
Such control is suggested to coordinate potentiation of presynaptic transmitter production 
with levels of postsynaptic protein synthesis aimed at enabling the postsynaptic cell to cope 
with time-varying loads of presynaptic input. Akers et a.l. (1986) have shown that "protein 
kinase activation leading to phosphorylation of neural proteins appears to occupy a pivotal 
role in the development a.nd expression of synaptic plasticity" in response to perforant path 
stimulation (p. 587). Further experiments are needed to test possible correlations between 
presynaptic and postsynaptic effects. This proposal also suggested that the shape of neurons 
realizes a. type of structural dipole that helps to support the dynamics of the chemical 
dipole. The two poles of the structural dipole, at the dendritic apparatus/cell body a.nd 
the synaptic knobs, respectively, were suggested to help maintain chemical gradients along 
the axons between these poles. Interactions between the cell nucleus, the cell membrane, 
microtubules, and tight junctions between presynaptic terminals a.nd postsynaptic cells were 
proposed to maintain these gradients. Further details concerning these predicted chemical 
dipole properties, may be found in Grossberg (1969a). 
Sections 16-22 summarize computer simulations that demonstrate other model proper-
tics that are consistent with conditioning data.. 
16. Stability of Learning Over Many Trials 
Some learning models become unstable when they experience a large number of learning 
trials. Figure 16 shows the output of the model after 4, 50 a.nd 100 learning trials, illustrating 
that this output pattern persists over many trials, even after asymptote is reached. 
Figure 16 
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17. Robustness of the Model 
Model properties are robust under physically plausible perturbations of its structure or 
parameters. For example, Figure 17a shows that the asymptotic behavior of the model is 
qualitatively preserved under large changes in the learning rate az in (10). Figure 17b shows 
that the model's behavior is unaffected by changes in the parameter which controls the speed 
at which the competition among sensory representations Stake place. Figure 17c shows that 
the circuit's qualitative behavior is robust against large accelerations or decelerations of the 
rate at which 1J generates the Now Print signal. 
Figure 17 
The adaptive timing circuit learns accurately even when the behavior of some other part 
of the model is qualitatively altered. In Figures 8 through 17, the parameters controlling the 
STM representations S were chosen so that STM can store more than one item. In Figure 
18, the parameters were chosen so that only one sensory representation can remain active 
through time. This has a dramatic effect upon the singly-gated signals f(x;j)Yii within the 
model, since their support from S1 does not persist when S0 is large on training trials, but 
it has little effect upon the timing of the circuit, which again reaches maximal total activity 
R at around the time the US is expected. 
Figure 18 
18. Inverted U and Weber Law 
Figure 1 shows the average nictitating membrane topographies of animals trained with 
C S's of 50 msec duration and lSI's of 125, 250, 500, or 1000 ms, depending upon the group to 
which the animal belonged. Figure 19 displays the outputs of the model at the corresponding 
lSI's. The model mimics the data pattern of rapid growth of the peak amplitude as the ISI 
increases through small values, followed by a gradual fall-off of peak amplitude for larger 
values of the lSI; and an increase in output width across time as the ISI increases. 
Figure 19 
19. Comparison with Data using Multiple lSI's 
Figure 20 summarizes data from experiments, reported in Millenson et al. (1977), in 
which rabbits were conditioned in a nictitating membrane response paradigm. The ISI was 
one of two different values: 200ms or 700ms, with the different lSI's being presented at 
differing frequencies to different groups. In the group P1 which received equal numbers of 
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each ISI, the animals' average NM extension on test trials shows a double peak for the longer 
trials. The two peaks also exhibit the Weber law property. These double peak experiments 
provide strong evidence that a spectrum of possible times exists that is tuned by experience. 
Figure 21 summarizes a computer simulation of that condition, which also exhibits two peaks 
that obey the Weber la.w at the two times at which the US would have been delivered. 
20. lSI Shift Experiments 
Figure 20 
Figure 21 
In Coleman and Gormezano (1971), animals were conditioned in a. paradigm whose 
temporal characteristics were shifted either gradually or abruptly, from a 200 msec lSI to a. 
700 msec lSI, or conversely, during the course of the experiment. The animals' behaviors 
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across learning trials are summarized in Figure 22. Figure 23 summarizes a set of computer 
simulations that qualitatively mimic the conditions of the original experiments. 
Figure 22 
Figure 23 
21. Partial Reinforcement Experiments 
The classical conditioning circuit depicted in Figure 5 forms part of a larger model neural 
system that is capable of explaining many data about operant conditioning (see Grossberg, 
1982a, 1982b, 1984, 1987a and Part II forfurther discussion). Correspondingly, many operant 
conditioning data share similar properties with classical conditioning data. For example, the 
experiments of Roberts (1981) used an operant rat lever-pressing task in which frequency 
of reinforcement was varied but the lSI was fixed. This manipulation altered the terminal 
level of responding to the stimulus, without changing the peak time of responding; that is, 
partial reinforcement affects the likelihood, but not the timing, of the response. The results 
are shown in Figure 24. 
Figure 24 
A computer simulation of the same paradigm is shown in Figure 25. As in the Roberts 
(1981) data, only the level, not the time at which the output peaked, was affected by the 
probability of reinforcement. 
Figure 25 
22. Time Averaging in Response to Multiple Stimuli 
Holder and Roberts (1985) examined the effect of combining the timed responses to two 
different C S stimuli, a tone and a light, using rats in a lever-pressing task. If each of these 
stimuli has acquired the ability to elicit a conditioned response, and if they are presented 
sequentially, the resulting response is timed neither as the former nor as the latter stimulus 
would have required, but rather as an average. A simulation that qualitatively replicates 
this averaging property is shown in Figure 26. This figure was generated with the model 
parameters set so that more than one sensory representation could be active in STM at 
one time. When the two stimuli were presented, the resulting output produced a peak that 
averages between the two expected times of arrival. 
Figure 26 
PART II 
REINFORCEMENT, RECOGNITION, AND MOTOR LEARNING 
The spectral timing part of the circuit in Figure 5 is new. The remainder of the circuit 
is part of a larger theory concerning the neural substrates of reinforcement, recognition, 
attention, memory search, and motor control. Relevant parts of the theory are summarized 
below. They are used to clarify how the adaptive timing circuit interacts with other types 
of brain circuits, and to show how recent neurobiological data support the existence of each 
of the model's processing stages. 
23. Reinforcement Learning in Vertebrates and Invertebrates 
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In Section 4, a drive representation 1J was defined as a population of cells at which sensory, 
reinforcement, and homeostatic, or drive, signals converge to regulate reinforcement learning, 
emotional reactions, and motivational decisions. Figure 27 depicts the type of model circuit 
in which drive representations were described in Grossberg (1971) to explain vertebrate 
conditioning data. A similar model (Figure 28) has recently been used to explain invertebrate 
conditioning data from experiments on Aplysia (Buonomano, Baxter, and Byrne, 1990; 
Grossberg, 1984b ). The use of a similar circuit by such different species is clarified by the fact 
that it is the simplest solution of two general learning problems, called the synchronization 
problem and the persistence problem, that all animals capable of classical conditioning need 
to solve (Grossberg, 1971, 1982b, 1987a). 
Figure 27 
Figure 27 contains pathways that were omitted from Figure 5 for simplicity. As noted in 
Section 6, during classical conditioning, pairing of a C S1 sensory representation Scs, with 
activation of a drive representation 1J by a reinforcer US causes the modifiable synapses 
connecting Scs, with 1J to become strengthened. This conditioning event converts C S1 into 
a conditioned reinforcer. Figure 27 shows reciprocal conditionable pathways from the drive 
representations 1J to the sensory representations S. Conditioning of these pathways is called 
incentive motivational learning. Activation of conditioned s _, 1J _, S feedback pathways 
by C S1 can shift attention towards the set of all previously reinforced sensory cues that are 
motivationally consistent with v. 
Figure 28 
This shift of attention occurs because the sensory representations, in addition to emitting 
conditioned reinforcer signals and receiving incentive motivation signals, compete among 
themselves (Figures 27) for a limited capacity short-term memory (STM). When strong 
incentive motivational feedback signals are received at the sensory representational field, 
these signals can bias the competition for STM activity towards the set of motivationally 
preferred cues. 
24. Attentional Focusing, Blocking, and the Hippocampus 
The feedback signals S _, V _, s generate a resonant state of activation between levels S 
and v that focuses attention upon recognition codes of events which have led to reinforcing 
consequences during past experiences. Such attentional modulation enables a biological 
information processing system to selectively process those environmental inputs that are most 
important to its current goals. A typical example of such selective processing is illustrated 
by the blocking paradigm shown in Figure 29 (Kamin, 1969). First, a conditioned stimulus 
C S1, such as a tone, is presented several times, followed at a given time interval by an 
unconditioned stimulus US, such as electric shock, until a conditioned response CR, such as 
fear, develops. Then C S1 and another conditioned stimulus, C Sz, such as light, are presented 
simultaneously, followed at the same time interval by the US. After conditioning, C S2 is 
presented alone, not followed by a US, and no conditioned response occurs. Intuitively, CS1 
"blocks" conditioning of the simultaneously presented C Sz because C S1, by itself, perfectly 
predicts its consequence, the US. The CSz is thus redundant and unpredictive, hence does 
not get conditioned to the US. 
Figure 29 
The blocking property may be explained in terms of four properties of the network in 
Figure 26: (1) Pairing of a C S1 with a US in the first phase of the blocking experiment 
endows the C S1 cue with properties of a conditioned, or secondary, reinforcer; that is, the 
positive feedback pathway S1 _, V _, s1 between the drive representation 1J and the sensory 
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representation s1 of C Sr is strengthened due to learning. (2) These reinforcing properties 
of a C S1 shift the focus of attention towards its own processing at s1 . (3) The processing 
capacity of attentional resources is limited, as a result of the competition between sensory 
representations S. Thus a shift of attention towards one set of stimuli can prevent other 
stimuli, such as CS2, from being attended (Figure 28). Withdrawal of attention from the 
sensory representation S2 of the stimulus C Sz prevents that representation from entering new 
conditioned relationships, by attenuating learning from S to 1J and from 1J to S. Learning is 
attenuated when the activity S2 of s2 becomes small, because it is regulated by an activity-
dependent gate, as in (4). 
Just as simultaneous occurrence of a conditioned reinforcer C S1 with a new C Sz can 
block conditioning of C Sz, so too can simultaneous occurrence of a primary reinforcer US 
with a new C S block conditioning of C S. This latter property helps to explain why US 
onset needs to occur after C S onset in order for effective conditioning to occur (Buonomano, 
Baxter, and Byrne, 1990; Grossberg, 1982b; Grossberg and Levine, 1987). 
One way to verify whether a neural model has processing stages that correlate well with 
brain circuits is to test if a formal model lesion has effects similar to those of a corresponding 
brain lesion on behavioral properties. Grossberg (1975, Figure 24) suggested that a final com-
mon path within (an expanded model of) a drive representation 1J includes the hippocampal 
formation. Eliminating the "hippocampal formation" in the model would therefore weaken 
1J __, S feedback signals, and thus the model's mechanism of blocking. Hippocampal lesions 
do, in fact, prevent blocking from occurring. Both C S1 and C 52 can be conditioned in a 
blocking experiment performed on a hippocampectomized animal (Le Doux, 1989; Rickert, 
Bennett, Lane, and French, 1978; Schmajuk, Spear, and Isaacson, 1983; Solomon, 1977). 
Likewise, hippocampectomized animals find it hard to actively ignore nonreinforced cues 
(Pribram, 1986). 
These experiments also showed that hippocampal lesions do not interfere with emotional 
conditioning. Although such a dissociation could not be explained in the model of Figure 27 
and 28, it can be explained using the model of Figure 4, which distinguishes the circuit for 
adaptive timing from the circuit for emotional conditioning. A circuit which combines the 
components of Figure 4 with those of Figure 26 is shown in Figure 30. 
Figure 30 
25. Subcortical Fear Conditioning and a Cortical Role in Extinction 
The circuit in Figure 30 includes sensory representations S that process incoming signals 
in two successive processing stages s(I) and s(2). In Grossberg (1971, 1975, 1978, 1982b) it 
was shown that each sensory representation S need to be broken into two successive stages 
s(l) and s(2), as in Figure 30, such that s(I) projects to both s(2) and V, 1J projects to s(2), 
and s(2) projects back to s(1). The pathway s(I) __, 1J can support emotional conditioning, 
thereby converting the stimuli represented at s(I) into conditioned reinforcers. The pathway 
1J _, s(2) supports incentive motivational conditioning. It primes all sensory representations 
that are motivationally consistent with 'D. The multisynaptic pathway 1J __, s(2) __, s(I) 
provides the feedback from D that supports the blocking process. This expanded version of 
the model has been used to computationally simulate blocking data (Grossberg and Levine, 
1987). 
Grossberg (1975, 1978) interpreted the first stage of sensory processing s(I) as a tha-
lamic representation, the second stage s(2) as a cortical representation, the first stages of 
drive representational processing 1J as networks, such as hypothalamus and amygdala, that 
are involved in homeostatic and emotional processing, and the final stages of drive represen-
tational processing as including the hippocampal formation. With this interpretation, the 
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conditioning of s(1) ~ 1J synapses in Figure 30 predicts that subcortical emotional condi-
tioning is possible. This prediction has been supported by recent experiments which show 
that ablation of visual cortex does not interfere with acquisition of fear responses to visual 
stimuli, but does greatly prolong, if not prevent, extinction of fear responses (LeDoux, Ro-
manski, Xagoraris, 1989). Analogous results have been reported for auditory conditioning. 
Fear conditioning to acoustic stimuli is mediated by projections from auditory processing 
areas of the thalamus to the amygdala, which bypass the auditory cortex and provide a 
subcortical mechanism of emotional learning (LeDoux, Iwata, Cicchetti, and Reis, 1988). 
An ablation of cortex that spares the thalamus would, in the model, remove s(2) but leave 
sU) intact. The acquisition of fear responses is mediated by the intact conditioned reinforcer 
pathways s(1) ~ v. Extinction in the model is mediated by cognitive mechanisms, described 
in Sections 27 and 28, that act upon the ablated cortical s(2) representations. These s(2) 
representations alter the dynamics of the s(1) and 1J representations via s(2) ~ s(1) and 
s(1) ~ 1J interactions in a way that causes extinction (Grossberg, 1982b, 1984a). Thus a 
selective ablation of s(2) spares acquisition of fear conditioning but impairs extinction, as 
also occurs in the data. This explanation of normal acquisition with abnormal extinction 
is consistent with the fact that acquisition may itself be impaired in paradigms wherein the 
abnormal distractibility of hippocampectomized animals occurs (see Section 28). Such data 
provide support for the model's anatomical interpretation of the interactions s{l) ~ 1J and 
s(2) ~ sUl. The prediction in Grossberg (1975) that the v ~ s pathway is a hippocampal to 
cortical pathway is consistent with experiments of Rosene and Van Hoesen (1977). Thus the 
main anatomical and functional properties of the model have neurobiological correlates that 
permit its operations to be subjected to additional neurobiological tests, and to be refined 
in the light of new neural data. 
Further support for the model derives from its ability to provide a unified mechanistic 
explanation of a large data base about conditioned behavior, including data about unblock-
ing, latent inhibition, overexpectation, behavioral contrast, vicious circle behavior, selective 
forgetting, hyperphagia, and analgesia (Grossberg, 1972a, 1972b, 1975, 1982b, 1984a). A 
recent summary of other predictions and their experimental support is found in Carpenter 
and Grossberg (1991a, 1991 b) and Grossberg (1991 ). 
One issue of particular interest concerns whether or not there exists an analog of the 
vertebrate thalamocortical pathway s1 _, S2 in certain invertebrate circuits. Such a pathway 
is not described in the invertebrate model of Figure 27. Another important issue concerns the 
anatomieal sites that subserve the motor learning, or "habit strength", pathways in Figures 
27 and 30. Various data suggest that these pathways include the cerebellum. 
26. Conditioning in the Cerebellum 
Thompson et al. (1984, 1987) reviewed many experiments which implicate the cerebellum 
as "an obligatory part of the learned response circuit for eyelid/NM conditioning" (Thompson 
et al., 1987, p. 353). In particular, they noted that ablation of deep cerebellar nuclei abolishes 
the previously learned response, prevents relearning of the response as a result of ipsilateral 
stimulation (although such stimulation continues to evoke unconditioned responses), but has 
no effect upon acquisition of the response as a consequence of contralateral stimulation. They 
also summarized data from their laboratory showing that "the dorsal accessory olive-climbing 
fiber projection is the necessary and sufficient US pathway ... the mossy fiber projection is 
the necessary and sufficient C S pathway ... and ... appropriately timed conjoint activation 
of mossy fibers as the C S and climbing fibers as the US yields normal learning of discrete, 
adaptive behavioral CSs" (Thompson et al., 1987, pp. 387-388). Clark et al. (1984) have 
shown, moreover, that lesions of the deep cerebellar nuclei not only abolish the conditioned 
behavioral response, but also abolish the hippocampal temporal model of the behavior (Part 
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I) in response to ipsilateral U Ss. Administration of contralateral U Ss quickly causes the 
reacquisition of both the neuronal model and the behavioral response. Taken together, these 
data strongly support the hypothesis that conditioning of the C S-activated discrete adaptive 
response occurs in the cerebellum and that these cerebellar signals are needed for expression 
of the hippocampal temporal model. 
The hxpothesis that the cerebellum helps to control motor learning has a long history. 
Brindley (1964) and Grossberg (1964) were among the first to model motor learning in the 
cerebellum at the synapses between cerebellar parallel fibers and Purkinje cell dendritic 
spines, using the climbing fibers as a teaching signal. Grossberg (1969c), Marr (1969), and 
Albus (1971) further modelled this concept. Marr (1969) suggested that these synapses 
increase in strength due to learning; Albus (1971) suggested that they decrease in strength; 
Grossberg (1969c) suggested that they may either increase or decrease in strength, depending 
upon the learning context. Subsequent models of cerebellar motor learning include those 
of Bullock and Grossberg (1991), Fujita (1982a, 1982b), Grossberg and Kuperstein (1986, 
1989), Houk, Singh, Fisher, and Barto (1989), and Ito (1974, 1984). These cerebellar models 
have been used to analyse behavioral and neural data about eye and arm movements, such 
as the results of Ebner and Bloedel (1981), Gilbert and Thach (1977), Ito (1982), Optican 
and Robinson (1980), and Ron and Robinson (1973). In addition to their discussions of 
nictitating membrane and jaw movement conditioning, Thompson et al. (1984, 1987) also 
summarized experiments demonstrating motor learning in the cerebellum during classical 
conditioning of the limb flexion reflex. Thus the cerebellum plays a key role in conditioning 
motor responses of eye, arm, leg, nictitating membrane, and jaw movements, among others. 
These recent data and models about cerebellar learning clarify how motor responses 
are adaptively controlled, and also suggest that motor learning differs from the types of 
conditioned reinforcer learning, incentive motivational learning, recognition learning, and 
adaptive timing that are depicted in Figures 4, 27, and 30. 
27. Macrocircuit for Sensory-Cognitive Processing: Adaptive Resonance Theory 
It remains to describe how the orienting system A in Figure 4 is controlled; in particular, 
how the unexpected nonoccurrence of a reinforcer can activate A and thereby cause orienting 
reactions, attention shifts, and emotional frustration. With this information in hand, the 
hypothesis that drive representations v inhibit A in response to expected nonoccurrences 
can be better understood as a mechanism for preventing maladaptive reactions to predictive 
cues. It also remains to diseuss how extinction is controlled via this process, as remarked in 
Section 25. 
These types of reactions are modelled by sensory-cognitive circuits that are called Adap-
tive Resonance Theory, or ART models. ART models have been used to explain and predict 
a large body of cognitive and neural data about recognition learning, attention, and memory 
search (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991a; Commons, Grossberg, and Staddon, 1991; Gross-
berg, 1982a, 1987a, 1987b, 1988). ART systems suggest a solution to a fundamental learning 
problem that is called the stability-plasticity dilemma: An adequate self-organizing recog-
nition system must be capable of plasticity in order to learn about significant new events, 
yet it must also remain stable in response to irrelevant or often repeated events. In order to 
prevent the relentless degradation of its learned codes by the "blooming, buzzing confusion" 
of irrelevant experience, an ART system is sensitive to novelty. It is capable of distinguishing 
between familiar and unfamiliar events, as well as between expected and unexpected events. 
The importance of expectancy-related processes in conditioning and cognitive processes 
has been extensively documented since the pioneering work of Tolman (1932) and Sokolov 
(1958, 1968). In ART, interactions between an attentional subsystem and an orienting 
subsystem, or novelty detector, enable the network to self-stabilize its learning, without 
an external teacher, as the learned recognition code becomes globally self-consistent and 
predictively accurate; in other words, as the system familiarizes itself with an environment 
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by categorizing the information within it in a way that leads to behavioral success. The 
attentional subsystem undergoes both bottom-up learning and top-down learning within the 
LTM-marked pathways between the processing levels denoted by .r1 and .r2 in Figure 31. 
The top-down LTM process learns expectations. The network self-stabilizes its learning by 
matching its top-down expectations against bottom-up input patterns and using the degree 
of match or mismatch to regulate processes of learning or memory search, respectively. Thus 
ART suggests how novelty-sensitive matching processes regulate the course of learning. 
Figure 31 
By itself, the attentional subsystem is unable simultaneously to maintain stable repre-
sentations of familiar categories and to learn new categories for unfamiliar patterns. An 
isolated attentional subsystem may be either rigid and incapable of creating new recogni-
tion categories for unfamiliar patterns, or unstable and capable of ceaselessly recoding the 
recognition categories of familiar patterns. 
The orienting subsystem interacts with the attentional subsystem to maintain the stabil-
ity-plasticity balance. It resets the STM of the attentional subsystem when an unfamiliar 
event occurs and thereby initiates a memory search within the attentional subsystem for 
a better internal representation. The orienting subsystem is thus essential for expressing 
whether an input pattern is familiar and well represented by an existing recognition code, 
or unfamiliar and in need of a new recognition code. 
Figure 32 illustrates a typical ART memory search cycle. As shown in Figure 32a, an 
input vector I registers itself as a pattern X of activity, or short term memory (STM), across 
level .r1 . The .r1 output vector S is then transmitted through the multiple converging and 
diverging adaptive pathways emanating from .r1. This transmission event multiplies the 
vector S by a matrix of adaptive weights, or long term memory (LTM) traces, to generate 
a net input vector T to level .Fz. Lateral inhibitory interactions within .Fz contrast-enhance 
vector T. A compressed activity vector Y is thereby generated across .r2 . 
Figure 32 
Activation of F2 nodes may be interpreted as "making a hypothesis" about an input 
I. When Y is activated, it generates a signal vector U that is transmitted along top-down 
adaptive pathways. After multiplication of these top-down signals by a matrix of adaptive 
weights, or LTM traces, a net vector V inputs to .r1 (Figure 32b). Vector V plays the role 
of a learned top-down expectation. Activation of V hy Y may be interpreted as "testing 
the hypothesis" Y, or "reading out the category prototype" V. ART networks are designed 
to match the "expected prototype" V of the category against the active input pattern, or 
exemplar, I. 
This matching process may change the .r1 activity pattern X by suppressing activation 
of all the feature detectors in I that are not confirmed by V. The resultant pattern X* 
encodes the pattern of features to which the network "pays attention". If the expectation 
V is close enough to the input I, then a state of resonance occurs as the attentional focus 
takes hold. Damasio (1989) uses the term "convergence zones" to describe the process 
whereby an activation pattern X* across distributed features is bound together by resonant 
feedback. The resonant state persists long enough for learning to occur; hence the term 
adaptive resonance theory. ART systems learn prototypes, rather than exemplars, because 
the attended feature vector X*, rather than the input I itself, is learned. 
The criterion of an acceptable match is defmed by a dimensionless parameter called vig-
ilance. The vigilance parameter is computed in the orienting subsystem A, where it may 
be increased by punishing events or other unexpected consequences (Carpenter and Gross-
berg, 1987a; Carpenter, Grossberg, and Reynolds, 1991; Carpenter, Grossberg, Markuzon, 
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Reynolds, and Rosen, 1991). Vigilance weighs how close the input exemplar I must be to 
the top-down prototype V in order for resonance to occur. Because vigilance can vary across 
learning trials, recognition categories capable of encoding widely differing degrees of general-
ization, or morphological variability, can be learned by a single ART system. Low vigilance 
leads to broad generalization and abstract prototypes. High vigilance leads to narrow gen-
eralization and to prototypes that represent fewer input exemplars. In the limit of very high 
vigilance, prototype learning reduces to exemplar learning. Thus a single ART system may 
be used, say, to recognize abstract categories of faces and dogs, as well as individual faces 
and dogs. 
If the top-down expectation V and the bottom-up input I are too novel, or unexpected, 
to satisfy the vigilance criterion, then a bout of hypothesis testing, or memory search, is 
triggered. Memory search leads to selection of a better recognition code at level :F2 with 
which to represent input I at level :F2• The orienting subsystem A mediates the search 
process. During search, the orienting subsystem interacts with the attentional subsystem, 
as in Figures 32c and 32d, to enable the attentional subsystem to learn about novel inputs 
without risking unselective forgetting of its previous knowledge. 
The search process prevents associations from forming between Y and X* if X* is too 
different from I to satisfy the vigilance criterion. The search process resets Y before such an 
association can form. A familiar category may be selected by the search if its prototype is 
similar enough to the input I to satisfy the vigilance criterion. The prototype may then be 
refined in light of new information carried by I. If I is too different from any of the previously 
learned prototypes, then an uncommitted population of :F2 cells is selected and learning of 
a new category is initiated. 
A network parameter controls how deeply the search proceeds before an uncommitted 
node is chosen. As learning of a particular category self-stabilizes, all inputs coded by that 
category access it directly, without the need for search. Familiar, consolidated memories can 
thus be accessed in a one-pass fashion, after resetting the previously active category. The 
category selected is the one whose prototype provides the globally best match to the input 
pattern. In a situation where a mixture of familiar and unfamiliar events are experienced, 
familiar inputs can directly activate their learned categories, while novel inputs continue to 
trigger adaptive memory searches for better categories, until the network's memory capacity 
is fully utilized. 
These ART mechanisms include the processes that are needed to interpret the effects of 
D _,A inhibition that were described in Section 1. These include a process whereby learned 
expectations may be mismatched by a sensory expectation at level :F1 of the attentional 
subsystem in Figure 31. When a mismatch of bottom-up exemplar and top-down prototype 
occurs, the orienting subsystem is activated, giving rise to a short term memory (STM) 
reset wave in the form of a nonspecific arousal burst to the attentional subsystem (Figure 
32c). This arousal burst acts to reset the sensory representations of all sensory events that 
are currently active in STM within the attentional subsystem. Representations with high 
STM activation tend to become less active, representations with low STM activation tend 
to become more active, and the novel event which caused the mismatch tends to be more 
actively stored than it would have been had it been expected. Banquet and Grossberg (1987) 
have discussed experiments on human event-related potentials (ERPs) during probabilistic 
choice reaction time tasks that have tested the predicted chronometry of the mismatch-
arousal-reset sequence in terms of the P120-N200-P300 sequence of ERPs. One effect of 
STM reset is to shift the focus of attention towards sensory representations which may 
better predict environmental contingencies. In a classical conditioning paradigm, such an 
attention shift can dishabituate, or unblock, sensory representations that were not attended 
before the STM reset event (Grossberg, 1982a, 1982b ). Activation of the orienting subsystem 
also triggers orienting responses, such as the activation of motor reactions to orient towards 
the unexpected event (Figure 31). 
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This organization of learned expectations, attention shift mechanisms, and orienting 
mechanisms within ART allowed Grossberg and Schmajuk (1989) to hypothesize that acti-
vation of the drive representation v gates, or inhibits, the orienting subsystem A. Activation 
of this inhibitory gate prevents reset of the attentional focus and release of orienting be-
haviors if an expected nonoccurrence is experienced. Such a gating operation does not, 
however, prevent a sensory match from being detected earlier than usual, because matches 
with learned expectations occur within the attentional subsystem, not the orienting subsys-
tem. At times when the adaptive timing mechanism is inactive, the gate is open. Then 
activation of the orienting subsystem can trigger reset of STM and orienting reactions in 
response to unexpected nonoccurrences. 
28. Hippocampal Lesions and Medial Temporal Amnesia 
The division of labor within ART, between an attentional subsystem and an orienting 
subsystem, thus provides the type of processing substrate that is needed to instantiate adap-
tive timing heuristics. This division of labor has also been helpful in clarifying many other 
types of data. For example, Carpenter and Grossberg (1987a, 1988b) have pointed out that a 
lesion of the ART orienting subsystem creates a memory disturbance whose formal symptoms 
are similar to those of humans afflicted with medial temporal amnesia, including unlimited 
anterograde amnesia; limited retrograde amnesia; failure of consolidation; tendency to learn 
the first event in a series; abnormal reactions to novelty, including perseverative reactions; 
normal priming; and normal information processing of familiar events (Cohen, 1984; Graf, 
Squire, and Mandler, 1984; Lynch, McGauch, and Weinberger, 1984; Mattis and Kovner, 
1984; Squire and Butters, 1984; Squire and Cohen, 1984; Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1970, 
1974; Zola-Morgan and Squire, 1990). 
Unlimited anterograde amnesia occurs in the model because, without a functional ori-
enting subsystem, the network cannot carry out the memory search and subsequent learning 
needed to establish a new recognition code. Limited retrograde amnesia occurs because 
familiar events can directly access their recognition codes, without activating the orienting 
subsystem. Before events become familiar, a period of memory consolidation occurs during 
which the orienting subsystem does play a role, as indicated in Figure 32c. This failure 
of consolidation does not prevent learning per se. Instead, learning is associated with the 
first recognition category that is activated by bottom-up processing, much as "amnesics are 
particularly strongly wedded to the first response they learn" (Gray, 1982, p. 253). Abnor-
mal reactions to novelty, including perseverative reactions, occur. In an ART circuit, this 
happens because the orienting subsystem cannot carry out its normal function of STM reset, 
and therefore cannot inhibit sensory representations or top-down expectations that may be 
persistently mismatched by bottom-up sensory signals. The inability to search memory via 
its orienting subsystem prevents an ART system from discovering more appropriate stimulus 
combinations to which to attend. In a similar vein, Butters and Cermak (1975), p. 393) 
reported that "Korsakoff patients' encoding deficits may be related to a general impairment 
in their ability to attend to relevant dimensions of stimuli." Normal priming is possible in 
an ART model because it can be mediated entirely by the attentional subsystem, notably 
the top-down expectations of this subsystem. The close correspondence between the symp-
toms of medial temporal amnesia and the formal properties of an ART model with defective 
orienting subsystem is consistent with accumulating evidence for the hypothesis (Grossberg, 
1975) that the in vivo analog of the ART orienting subsystem intersects, or is closely linked 
to, the hippocampal formation. 
Similar behavioral problems have been identified in hippocampectomized monkeys. Oaf-
fan (1985) noted, for example, that fornix transection "impairs ability to change an estab-
lished habit ... (there is) impaired learning ability when one habit is to be formed in one 
set of circumstances and a different habit is to be formed in a different set of circumstances 
that is similar to the first and therefore liable to be confused with it" (p. 94). A similar 
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problem occurs in an ART network with a defective orienting subsystem. Such a defect 
prevents STM reset, which normally leads to memory search and learning of different repre-
sentations for the two similar events. Pribram (1986) calls such a process a "competence for 
recombinant context-sensitive processing" (p. 362). These ART mechanisms illustrate how 
memory consolidation and novelty detection may be mediated by the same neural structures 
(Zola-Morgan and Squire, 1990), and clarify why hippocampectomized rats have difficulty 
orienting to novel cues (O'Keefe and Nadel, 1978) and why there is a progressive reduction 
in novelty-related hippocampal potentials as learning proceeds in normal rats (Deadwyler, 
West, and Lynch, 1979; Deadwyler, West, and Robinson, 1981). In summary, localization 
of both orienting subsystem circuits and adaptive timing circuits in, or intimately related 
to, the hippocampal formation helps to explain a large body of neuropsychological data. 
Further hippocampal relationships to ART model mechanisms will be discussed below. 
29. A Synthesis of Sensory-Cognitive and Cognitive-Reinforcer Circuits 
We are now ready to join together the sensory-cognitive ART network in Figure 31a with 
the cognitive-reinforcer and adaptive timing network in Figure 30. When this is done, a strik-
ing formal similarity between the different types of circuits may be discerned. This similarity 
suggests that cognitive and emotional processes in the brain share many design properties in 
common (Grossberg, 1982b, 1984a), unlike artificial intelligence models of problem solving. 
Figure 33 
The sensory representations S in Figure 30 are recognition codes for sensory events. For 
definiteness, we identify them with the recognition codes at the level :Fz of the ART network 
in Figure 3la, as in Figure 31 b. When this is done, Figure 30 may be redrawn in a way that 
reveals a striking homology with the ART recognition circuit in Figure 31. A comparison 
between Figure 33a and Figure 33b illustrates this homology. In Figures 33a and 33b, the 
sensory representation level ;:1 and the drive representation level V play an analogous role. 
In particular, both level :F1 and level v send inhibitory signals to the orienting subsystem A. 
The inhibitory signals from :F1 prevent A from resetting STM at level ;:2 unless a sensory 
input pattern mismatches a top-down learned expectation at level :F1. The inhibitory signals 
from v help to prevent A from resetting level :F2 when a reinforced event is being attended. 
As noted in Section 24, such an attentive focus develops due to an exchange of positive 
feedback signals between levels ;:2 and v, supported by conditioned ;:2 ..... v ..... :r2 pathways. 
30. Influences of Hippocampectomy on Conditioned Timing 
This synthesis of cognitive and emotional networks enables the theory to explain a broad 
range of data concerning changes in conditioned timing that are due to hippocampectomy. 
The expanded model clarifies why the hippocampus is not needed for delay conditioning, 
but is needed for classical conditioning of more complex associations, such as reversal condi-
tioning and trace conditioning. It has been shown that bilateral hippocampectomy severely 
disrupts the rate of reversal of two-tone discrimination (Berger and Orr, 1983), reversal 
of cross-modality discrimination, and tone-light discrimination (Weikart and Berger, 1986). 
Hippocampectomy does not, however, disrupt initial learning of the discrimination (Berger, 
Berry, and Thompson, 1986). The deficit in reversal conditioning is consistent with the 
explanation of perseverative behavior due to disrupted STM reset and memory search that 
was given in Section 28. 
I-Iippocampectomy has a profound effect on NM response shape during trace condi-
tioning; for example, if a 100 msec C S duration and a 500 msec ISI are used. Then small, 
short-latency responses occur to the CS, rather than the large, adaptively timed long-latency 
responses of control animals (Solomon, Vander Schaaf, Thompson, and Weisz, 1983). The 
removal of the spectral timing process clarifies why the timed responses are eliminated. A 
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detailed study of the model circuit also clarifies why some responses remain. As Figure 29 
illustrates, the interactions between sensory representations S and drive representations V 
survive ablation of the adaptive timing circuit, so that certain aspects of motivated behavior 
remain intact. On the other hand, the role of the adaptive timing circuit in prolonging 
reactions to sensory cues, and in regulating the duration of motivated attention, are no 
longer available. This analysis also clarifies why properties of delay conditioning are altered 
by hippocampectomy (Berger, Berry, and Thompson, 1986; Port, Mikhail, and Patterson, 
1985). 
The model gains additional support from its ability to rationalize this pattern of condi-
tioned behavioral changes due to hippocampectomy. Although these data strongly suggest 
that the hippocampus plays an important role in the control of timing, they do not imply 
that other brain regions do not also contribute to the hippocampally observed "temporal 
model". The very fact that hippocampectomy alters conditioned behavioral timing indicates 
that timing is conditioned at hippocampal sites, as well as at non-hippocampal sites, such 
as the sites that control the cerebellar conditioned reactions (Section 26). 
31. Concluding remarks: Varieties of Learning Functions and Networks. 
The theory developed in this article provides a computational framework in which many 
behavioral and neural data about conditioning can be analysed. By identifying several prob-
lems that a behaving organism needs to solve in order to survive, the theory has been able 
to distinguish between several functionally distinct learning processes, to model several of 
their main mechanisms, and to outline a system architecture within which they are combined. 
These learning processes include adaptive timing, and the way in which it selectively inhibits 
unappropriate reactions to expected nonoccurrences; reinforcement learning, notably emo-
tional conditioning; incentive motivational learning, including the allocation of attention and 
the energizing of behavioral responses; recognition learning, including the bottom-up learn-
ing that initiates selection of recognition categories and the top-down learning of expecta-
tions that help to calibrate novelty and to control memory search; and response learning, 
including the conditioning of discrete defensive reflexes. This sort of integrative theory ex-
hibits features that are still quite novel in computational neuroscience. This is particularly 
true where the theory links together several conceptual and organizational levels in order to 
experimentally support its hypotheses. The theory provides behavioral analyses that help 
to identify functionally distinct brain processes, mathematically precise circuits that model 
these processes, unifying design principles to tie these circuits together into a system archi-
tecture, neural markers in terms of identifiable anatomical and physiologieal processes, and 
computer simulations and predictions to test this architecture at multiple levels of behavioral 
and neural organization. With such a foundation in hand, every new datum creates a series 
of implications that may support or confront the theory at multiple points, thereby creating 
multiple constraints for propelling further theoretical tests, modifications, and refinements. 
Such theories seem necessary if the immense masses of behavioral and neural data already 
available are ever to achieve a rational explanation. 
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APPENDIX 
Simulation methods: All simulations were performed on an Iris-4D /240 superwork-
station using double precision representations of all values. The Iris-4D series is based upon a 
microcomputer that conforms to the IEEE floating point standard for accuracy. Simulations 
were performed by integrating the dynamical system that defines the model. Integration 
of this system was performed using LSODA (The Livermore Solver for Ordinary Differen-
tial equations with Automatic method-switching for stiff and non-stiff systems; (Hindmarsh, 
1983; Petzold, 1983)). 
The time scale was chosen to be consistent with that used in Grossberg and Schmajuk 
(1989). Trials were set to be 2 "units" long. In Grossberg and Schmajuk (1989), trials were 
set to be 2000 "milliseconds" long. All parameters from their model were preserved as they 
appeared in the original, except that they were multiplied by the scale factor 1000. 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
Figure 1. Conditioning data from a nictitating membrane learning paradigm. Mean to-
pography of nictitating membrane response after learning trial 10 with a 50 msec CS, lSI's 
of 125, 250, 500, and 1000 msec, and different (1, 2, 4 MAmp) intensities of the shock US in 
each subsequent panel. Reprinted from Smith (1968) with permission. 
Figure 2. Computer simulation of Weber law property and inverted U in learning as a 
function of ISI. The output signal functions R(t) = L,;f(x;)y;z; are plotted on a test trial, 
in response to the CS alone, subsequent to 10 prior learning trials with CS-US separated by 
different lSI's. Successive curves from left to right were generated by lSI's of 0 (the lowest 
amplitude curve), 125, 250, 500, and 1000 msec using a US duration of 50 msec. and an Ius 
intensity of 10 units. (Reprinted from Grossberg and Schmajuk (1989) with permission.) 
Figure 3. A schematic of the training regimen in fixed-interval delay paradigm employed in 
the experiments summarized in Figure 4. After the conditioned stimulus was turned on, the 
first key peck after a certain interval was rewarded. During testing trials, the conditioned 
stimulus was turned on and remains on for an interval far longer than the expected delay, 
so that the subjects' behavior at delays greater than the expected ISI could be quantified. 
Figure 4. Data on pigeon key pecking in a fixed-interval delay condition. All animals were 
trained to respond to two different conditioned stimuli, one visual and one auditory, each of 
which predicted reward for the first key peck after a fixed interval. For the animals in the 
group whose behavior is summarized in the graph on the left, the tone signalled availability 
of reward after a 15 second delay and the light signalled availability of reward after a 30 
second delay. For a.nima.ls in the group whose behavior is summarized in the graph on the 
right, the tone signalled a.va.ila.bility of reward after a. 30 second delay a.nd the light signalled 
availability of reward after a 15 second delay. The times at which each response curve peaks 
correspond closely with the times at which each key peck is of maximal value. Also, within 
each stimulus modality, subjects' responses exhibit a. covaria.tion of peak time a.nd peak 
breadth, as in the Weher la.w property shown in Figures 1 a.nd 2. 
Figure 5 A START model that combines a. spectral timing module with a. reinforcement 
learning network to achieve a.daptively timed reinforcement learning and inhibition of the 
orienting subsystem. 
Figure 6. In a. START model, STM storage of a brief CS is achieved by positive feedback 
within the sensory representation s. CS attenuation by the US is dynamical!;: controlled 
by the strength of recurrent inhibitory signals. (a) Input h activated by CS1 ; (b) Input ! 0 
activated by US; (c) STM activation of CS1 sensory representation; (d) STM activation of 
US sensory representation. 
Figure 7. Four possible feedback signal functions f for STM storage by equation (2): (a) 
threshold-linear signa.!; (b) sigmoid signal; (c) binary signa.!; (d) threshold-jump-linear signa.!. 
Figure 8. Behavior of the Now Print module of the START model after many conditioning 
trials: (a) Activation of the sensory representation s1 by the CS; (b) Activation of the sensory 
rel?resenta.tion So by the US; (c) The resultant activation D of the drive representation v; 
(dJ The resultant Now Print signal N. 
Figure 9. Generation of a. Now Print signal: (a.) The output of a drive representation V 
is converted into a Now Print signa.! N by passing this output through a fast excitatory 
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pathway and a slower inhibitory pathway, whose signals converge at N: (b) Simulation of 
the activity D of Din response to two successive inputs, with the first response larger; (c) 
Activity N of N scales with the size of the increment in D. 
Figure 10. Spectral timing properties of a START model. The CS1 and US stimuli, 
were of intensity 10 for 0.05 time units and 0 otherwise. (a) The CS-activated spectrum 
!Ij(t) = f(x 11 (t)); (b) The habituating transmitter gates Yij(t). (c) The singly-gated spec-
trum 9Jj(t) = j(XJj(t))Yij(t). (d) The doubly-gated spectrum hij(t) = j(XJj(i))YJj(t)zJj(t) 
arising after 5 trials. (e) The corresponding output signal R(t). Simulations were per-
formed as described in the Appendix, with parameters and signal functions given by 1 = 
0.2,ay = l.O,;S'y = 125.0,az = 1.0,8 = O.O,t = 0.02,aE = 240.0,aA = 1.2,P'A = 120.0,/A = 
12.0,an = 120.0,P'n = 120.0,~ = O.O,fn(S) = [S- 0.05]+,a0 = 0.5,P'c = 25.0,j0 (D) = [D- 0.05]+, fA(A) = [A- 0.1] , Fx(A) = [A- 0.7]+, r1 = 10.125 / (0.0125 + j); and the 
intensities of the CS and US inputs I; in (1) equal 2. 
Figure 11. Selective learning within different spectral populations at a fixed ISI = 500 
msec. Each three-image panel from (a) to (f) represents the gated signal g11 (t) [top], long 
term memory trace z11(t) [middle], and doubly gated signal h11 (t) = g11 (t)z11 (t) [bottom], 
at a different value of j. In (a), j = 1; in (b), j = 17; in (c), j = 33; in (d), j = 49; in (e), j 
= 65; in (f), .i = 81. The same parameters as in Figure 10 were used. 
Figure 12. The effect of self-printing upon the output of the model. (a) A large threshold t 
in the Now Print signal abolishes self-printing and secondary conditioning. It generates the 
lower output R(t). (b) A smaller threshold allows secondary conditioning and self-printing 
without a loss of timing. It generates the larger output R(t). 
Figure 13. START model output R(t) during secondary conditioning with varying ISis 
between the first and second CS, and between the second CS and the US using the parameters 
of Figure 10. Notation ISI1 below denotes the ISI between CS1 and US, and ISI2 denotes 
the ISI between CS2 and CS1. On each learning trial either CS1 - US or CS2 - CS1 occur, 
but not CS2 - CS1 - US. The curves are drawn with CS1 - US pairings in the left column 
and CS2 - CS1 pairings in the right column. The vertical bars occur at successive .25 time 
unit intervals: (a),(b) ISI1 = .25, ISiz = .25; (c),(d) ISI1 = .5, ISiz = .25; (e),(f) ISI1 = .25, 
ISI2 = .5; (g),(h) ISI1 = .5, ISI2 = .5. 
Figure 14. A possible synaptic realization of spectral timing operations: (a) Different rates 
r1 can be realized at different (populations of) dentate granule cells. Each CSi activates 
branching pathways whose collaterals synapse at dendritic spines across a subset of cells 
that include all the rates r i. The Now Print signal N is delivered in a way that can influence 
all active synapses across all the dendritic spines. The successive stages Xij, Yij, and Zij of 
cellular activation and gating can, in principle, occur either postsynaptically, as in (b); or 
through a combination of presynaptic and postsynaptic operations, as in (b). 
Figure 15. Interpretation of the output signal R(t) in equation (ll) in terms of convergence 
of dentate granule cell outputs on CA3 pyramidal cells. 
Figure 16. Evolution of the model's output. Output R(t) on each of the first four condi-
tioning trials, followed by the C S alone on the fifth trial. Output after (b) 50 learning trials 
and (cJ 100 learning trials. 
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Figure 17. Stability of learned timing under modifications of model parameters. (a) Effect 
of choosing the spectral learning rate az in (10) to ~, 2, and 5 times that in Figure 16; (b) 
Effect of setting the rates a A, f3A, and lAin (1) of the sensory representations to~, 1, and 2 
times their values in Figure 16; (c) Effect of proportionally changing the rates aD, f3D, /D, 
and aE in (3) and (6) to 2 and 4 times that in Figure 16 in order to speed up the Now Print 
circuit. 
Figure 18. Stability of learned timing when strengthened inputs to the sensory represen-
tation field no longer allows STM of the CS to remain active after the US is stored in STM: 
(a) CS STM activity S1; (b) US STM activity S0: (c) spectral LTM traces after the first 
learning trial and in response to a CS alone on trial25; (d) output R(t) under the conditions 
of (c). STM parameters for this run: aA = 0.6,f3A = 60.0,/A = 60.0, US inputs ! 1 and Io in (1) have intensities equal to 10. 
Figure 19. An inverted U in output intensity as a functions of CS-US lSI as produced by 
the START model with parameters as shown in Figure 16. This figure was produced by 
plotting the outputs from the model to lSI's of 0.0, 0.125, 0.250, 0.500, and 1.000 units on 
a single set of axes. 
Figure 20. Conditioning data from the nictitating membrane response paradigm as reported 
by Millenson, Kehoe, and Gormezano (1977). Data shown are average NM extensions in CS-
only trials with a tone CS of length 200 ms (left-hand panels) and 700 ms (right-hand panels) 
in animals presented with varying mixtures of training trials: 200 ms tone CS's immediately 
followed by a 50 ms shock US and 700 ms tone CS's immediately followed by a 50 ms shock 
us. 
Figure 21. Output R(t) of the START model in a mixed lSI condition, such as in Figure 
19 (Panel P1) in which 50% of all lSI's were 0.2 units and 50% of all lSI's were 0.7 units. 
~ 
Figure 22. In the Coleman and Gormezano (1971) experiments, rabbits were initially 
conditioned to respond to a 90 dB. 1000 Hz. tone CS by pairing it to a 4 rna., 50 msec. 
60 Hz., periorbital shock US. 72 young (80-100 day old) rabbits were divided into 6 groups. 
Members of three of these groups were initially conditioned to respond with an ISI of 200 
msec. while members of the other three groups were conditioned to respond to stimuli with 
an ISI of 700 msec. After five days of initial conditioning, during which time all of the 
animals acquired a strong response to the CS beginning shortly after its onset and peaking 
at roughly the time of onset of the US, the inter-stimulus intervals of some of the subjects 
were changed. Two groups were exposed to a sudden change from one of the ISI's to the 
other (200 _, 700A and 700 _, 200A). Two of the groups were exposed to a gradual shift 
from one of the lSI's to the other, again symmetrically (200 _, 700G and 700 _, 200G). 
As controls, the inter-stimulus intervals of two groups (200C and 700C) were held constant. 
Subjects' responses were recorded over a period of four days in the experimental condition. 
The nictitating membrane responses under these ISI shift conditions are displayed. (From 
Coleman and Gormezano (1971 ), reprinted with permission.) 
Figure 23. Simulation of the model output R(t) under ISI shift conditions similar to those 
used in Coleman and Gormezano (1971 ). In the first column of each panel, the model output 
R(t) is displayed after 25 learning trials. Successive columns are displayed after a block of 8 
more learning trials. The vertical lines denote the ISI on the corresponding trial: (a) Gradual 
increase of lSI from .2 to .7 time units on successive learning trials; (b) Abrupt increase of 
lSI from .2 to .7 time units; (c) Gradual decrease of lSI from .7 to .2 time units; (d) Abrupt 
decrease of ISI from .7 to .2 units. 
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Figure 24. Effects of differing probability of reinforcement upon the timing and level of 
response. There is no statistically significant difference between the time at which responding 
peaks. (Reprinted with permission from Roberts (1981 ). ) 
Figure 25. Model output in a condition simulating the partial reinforcement paradigm of 
Roberts (1981 ). In the upper curve, 80% of all presentations of the CS were followed by 
presentations of the US. In the lower curve, 20% of all presentations of the CS were followed 
by presentations of the US. Despite this difference, the time at which the peak outputs occur 
is roughly equal, and only the relative levels of output are different. 
Figure 26. Simulated time-averaging behavior in response to two CSs: (a) Model outputs 
R(t) in response to the two CBs presented individually; (b) Composite model output R(t) 
in response to the two CBs presented on the same trail at the same relative onset times as 
in (a). The first vertical line designates the onset time of the first CS, and the second that 
of the second CS. 
Figure 27. Schematic conditioning circuit: conditioned stimuli ( C S;) activate sensory repre-
sentations (Scs1 ) which compete among themselves for limited capacity short-term memory 
activation and storage. The activated Scs1 elicit conditionable signals to drive representa-
tions and motor command representations. Learning from a Scs1 to a drive representation 
D is called conditioned reinforcer learning. Learning from D to a Scs1 is called incentive 
motivational learning. Signals from D to Scs1 are elicited when the combination of external 
sensory plus internal drive inputs is sufficiently large. 
Figure 28. A model for conditioning in A plysia. S N = sensory neuron, F N = facilitatory 
neuron, IN= inhibitory neuron. The SN play the role of sensory representations S, the F N 
the role of a drive representation D, and the IN carry out the competition between sensory 
representations. 
Figure 29. A schematic of the Pavlovian blocking paradigm. The two phases of the 
experiment are discussed in the text. 
Figure 30. A START model with feedback pathways D _, s(2) _, s(1) that are capable 
of focussing attention in an adaptively timed fashion on reinforcing events. The sensory 
representations S are broken into two successive levels s(l) and s(2). Levels s(1) and s(2) 
interact via reciprocal excitatory pathways. The excitatory pathways s(1) _, D and D _, s(2) 
are adaptive. Representations in s(2) can fire only if they receive convergent signals from 
s(1) and D. Then they deliver positive feedback to s(!) and bias the competition to focus 
attention on their respective features. Thus, prior to conditioning, a CS can be stored in 
STM at s(l) and can subliminally prime s(2) and D representations without supraliminally 
firing these representations. After conditioning, the CS can trigger positive s(1) _, D _, s(Z) _, 
s(l) feedback and draw attention to itself as it activates the emotional representations and 
motivational pathways controlled by D. 
Figure 31. Anatomy of an adaptive resonance theory (ART) circuit: (a) Interactions be-
tween the attentional and orienting subsystems: Learning of recognition codes takes place at 
the long term memory (LTM) traces within the bottom-up and top-down pathways between 
levels :F1 and :F2. The top-down pathways can read-out learned expectations, or templates, 
that are matched against bottom-up input patterns at :F1 . Mismatches activate the orienting 
subsystem A, thereby resetting short term memory (STM) at :F2 and initiating search for 
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another recognition code. Output from subsystem A can also trigger an orienting response. 
Sensitivity to mismatch at F 1 is modulated by vigilance signals from the drive representa-
tions. (b) Trainable pathways exist between level Fz and the drive representations. Learning 
from Fz to a drive representation 1J endows a recognition category with conditioned rein-
forcer properties. Learning from TJ to Fz associates TJ with a set of motivationally compatible 
categories. In general, more than two processing levels F; are used in ART systems. 
Figure 32. ART search for an Fz code: (a) The input pattern I generates the specific STM 
activity pattern X at F 1 as it nonspecifically activates the orienting subsystem A. Pattern X 
both inhibits A and generates the output signal pattern S. Signal pattern S is transformed 
into the input pattern T, which activates the STM pattern Y across Fz. (b) Pattern Y 
generates the top-down signal pattern U which is transformed into the prototype pattern 
V. If V mismatches I at F 1, then a new STM activity pattern X* is generated at F 1. 
The reduction in total STM activity which occurs when X is transformed into X* causes a 
decrease in the total inhibition from F 1 to A. (c) If the matching criterion fails to be met, 
A releases a nonspecific arousal wave to Fz, which resets the STM pattern Y at F2. (d) 
After Y is inhibited, its top-down prototype signal is eliminated, and X can be reinstated 
at F 1. Enduring traces of the prior reset lead X to activate a different STM pattern Y* at 
F2. If the top-down prototype due toY* also mismatches I at F 1 , then the search for an 
appropriate Fz code continues. 
Figure 33. A schematic representation showing the close homology between the sensory-
cognitive ART circuit shown in Figure 31 and the cognitive-emotional circuit shown in Figure 
30. (a) The sensory-cognitive circuit consists of a level F 1 for representing activation of sen-
sory features. Level F 1 interacts with a sensory representation level F2 that encodes learned 
chunks, or compressed representations, of the sensory features. Level F 1 interacts with level 
F2 via reciprocal pathways that are adaptive and excitatory. Level F 1 also inhibits the ori-
enting subsystem A. (b) The sensory-drive ART circuit consists of a drive representation 
level that interacts with a sensory representation level S via reciprocal pathways that are 
adaptive and excitatory. Levelv also inhibits the orienting systems A. The circuits (a) and 
(b) are combined by incorporating level F2 into level s as described in the text. 
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